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THE PROPERTIES OF INSTABILITY: MARKETS.
PREDATION. RACIALIZED GEOGRAPHY. AND
PROPERTY LAW
AUDREY G. MCFARLANE*
A central, symbolic image supporting property ownership is the
image of stability. This symbol motivates most because it allows for settled
expectations, promotes investment, and fulfills a psychological need for
predictability. Despite the symbolic image, property is home to principles
that promote instability, albeit a stable instability. This Article considers an
overlooked but fundamental issue: the recurring instability experienced by
minority property owners in ownership of their homes. This is not an
instability one might attribute solely to insufficient financial resources to
retain ownership, but instead reflects an ongoing pattern, exemplified
throughout the twentieth century, of purposeful involuntary divestment of
land owned by members of racial minorities, particularly Black Americans.
The subprime mortgage crisis, the most current manifestation of this
involuntary land loss, can be attributed to property doctrine's policy
embrace of markets and importation of contract principles such as the
"freedom of contract." This embrace of markets and contracts ignores the
reality that real estate markets are racially segregated, and due to the nature
of those disparate markets, easily exploitable. The current racially
concentrated subprime mortgage crisis has torn the stable property image
apart by revealing longstanding truths: that fraud, exploitation, and
desperation are not anomalous. These truths present a disquieting reality:
that the persistent and enduring experience for minorities is instability. They
also present an overlooked insight that there is a dark side of property
ownership: that fraud, exploitation, and desperation are the bad that enables
the good of property markets. Because this "bad" is both Ubiquitous and
geographically situated, it suggests that stability for some within the system
of property ownership is provided at the expense of instability for others.
This Article argues that we should begin to pay attention to an undertheorized stick in the bundle of property rights: "the right to keep."
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INTRODUCTION

fPJossession fiJs protected against disturbance by fraud. . .. 1
The more segregated that a community of color is, the more
likely it is that homeowners. . . will face foreclosure because
the lenders who peddled the most toxic loans targeted those
communities. 2
Race is a verb. Race is a dynamic. 3
As of this writing, the nation is engulfed in a foreclosure crisis.
Defaults on mortgage payments are resulting in thousands of actions to
cut off equities of redemptions and evict 'people from their homes. The
crisis of land loss that has followed the deflation of the housing price
bubble has been stunning. This is certainly a period in history with
many sobering lessons to dissect. Questions unthinkable just a few
years ago, such as whether homeownership or rental housing represents
the best land tenure arrangement, are on the table. 4 Before these thorny

1.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 207 (Little, Brown, &
Co. 1909) (1881).
2.
Protecting the American Dream (Part II): Combating Predatory Lending
under the Fair Housing Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Congo 11 (2010)
(statement of Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice).
3.
Kendall Thomas, Dir. of the Ctr. for the Study of Law & Culture,
Columbia Law Sch., Remarks at the Workshop on Property at the Association of
American Law School Mid-Year Meeting (June 2010); see also Charles R. Lawrence
III, If He HoJJers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, DUKE L.J.
431(1990), reprinted in MARl J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD
DELGADO & KIMBERLE W. CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53, 61 (1993) (citing Kendall
Thomas, Comments at Frontiers of Legal Thought Conference, Duke Law School (Jan.
26, 1990)).
4.
E.g., Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or
Illusion of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 575-76 (2009); Arlo Chase,
Rethinking the Homeownership Society: Rental Stability Altemative, 18 J.L. & POL'y
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questions can be answered, a fundamental question has been
overlooked: why did the foreclosure crisis begin in a racialized way,
and why was the legal system at such a loss to do anything to avert the
crisis? The conventional understanding is that banks made loans to
people to buy homes they could not afford. 5 It is also commonly
assumed, but without real comprehension, that members of racial
minorities were grossly overrepresented as holders of these defaulted
loans. 6 But this inchoate account, without further exploration of the
statistical reality, simply leaves the impression that members of racial
minorities were more foolish than anyone else and responsible for their
own plight. The raising of race and the silence around an explanation
leaves racial presumptions to fill in the gap.7
But scratch the surface and the details behind the statistics reveal a
different story from the one that is commonly told about foreclosure
from defaults on the underlying toxic subprime loans. Most striking is a
seemingly unprecedented level of exploitative, predatory conduct on the
part of lenders, brokers, and thieves posing as mortgage borrowers.
Also striking was the important role that the physical, spatial location in
racially segregated neighborhoods played in the concentration and
effectiveness of predatory behavior. 8 These are places that most tacitly
and sometimes explicitly agreed to avoid; places that have been
racialized Black, and either literally or figuratively classified as poor
and undesirable. These are places where default and foreclosure are so
normal that the recent mortgage foreclosure crisis has been considered
noteworthy for moving beyond "the usual places.,,9

61, 62 (2009); Stephanie M. Stern, ResidentiaJ Protectionism and the Legal Mythology
ofHome, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1093, 1096 (2009).
5.
See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
7.
See Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White
Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REv.
269, 313 (1994) ("[T]he silence on race is filled with racial content as coded terms and
images perform the recitatifof American life and law. ").
8.
Benjamin Howell, Comment, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated
Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 101, 103-04 (2006)
("Subprime lending is geographically concentrated in the same minority neighborhoods
once denied access to banks and excluded from federal homeownership programs
because of their racial composition. ").
9.
It is because the "inner city" has been understood to be the usual place for
foreclosures that the recent expansion of foreclosures to the suburbs is considered
newsworthy. See, e.g., Kara McGuire, Late Mortgage Payments Rise in February:
Minnesota's Foreclosure Crisis Continues and May Be Shifting to the Suburbs, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 8, 2010, at 2D; Thomas Ott & Michael O'Malley,
Housing Downtum Hits SuburbS Just as Hard' Foreclosures Jump Outside Cleveland,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 24, 2007, at AI.
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It appears, therefore, that the place where the subprime mortgage
crisis began presents a reality that defies every image or expectation of
stability that we have for property ownership. The high rates of
defaulting high-interest, structurally destructive subprime loans
disproportionately held by Blacks and Latinos lO present a troubling
reality of involuntary divestment of ownership. Yet, the subprime crisis
is merely one of a long and striking list of episodes of involuntary
divestment from ownership of minority property owners. The instability
of ownership is not unprecedented. Instead, a pattern of exploitation,
predation, and minority foreclosure or eviction crises extends as far
back as the post-slavery origins of sharecropping in the South. l1 This

10.
See, e.g., Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Comment, Defrauding the American
Dream: Predatory Lending in Latino Communities and Reform of Califomia 's Lending
Law, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1279, 1280-81 (2009) ("Spanish speakers were among the
most victimized by predatory lenders because they were often misled about the terms of
the loan."); Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially

Targeted Predatory Lending under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. ToL.
L. REv. 211, 213 (2003) ("The recent explosive growth in the predatory subprime
market has 'created a crisis of epidemic proportions for communities of color, elderly
homeowners, and low-income neighborhoods [because of] the plague of predatory
mortgage lending. '" (quoting Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and

Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
107 Congo 404 (2001) (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN
Housing))); Richard Marsico & Jane Yoo, Racial Disparities in Subprime Home
Mortgage Lending in New York City: Meaning and Implications, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 1011, 1016-17 (2008-09) ("Overall, African-Americans, Latinos, and residents
of predOminantly minority neighborhoods [in New York City] were much more likely
to receive subprime home purchase loans than whites and residents of predominantly
white neighborhoods. Slightly more than half of all home purchase loans to AfricanAmericans (50.5%) were subprime. Only 10.7% of all home purchase loans to whites
were subprime. African-Americans were 4.7 times more likely than whites to receive
subprime loans. Nearly 37 % of all home purchase loans to Latinos were subprime
loans. . .. Latinos were over three times more likely than whites to receive subprime
loans .... Residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods were 5.8 times more
likely than residents of predominantly white neighborhoods to receive subprime home
purchase loans. H).
11.
Sharecropping was a farming arrangement where Blacks carried out all
steps of ownership yet remained tenant farmers living under a crushing and largely
inescapable debt peonage. See discussion infra Part II.D.l.a. See generally NICHOLAS
LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED
AMERICA (1991) (explaining that the conditions were so bad in the South, including
sharecropping, that it led to the great migration by Blacks from South to North in the
early twentieth century); ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC
STORY OF AMERICA'S GREAT MIGRATION 54 (2010) ("The Negro farm handO ... gets
for his compensation hardly more than the mule he plows, that is, his board and shelter.
Some mules fare better than Negroes." (internal quotation marks omitted».
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pattern suggests an alternate reality of property ownership: a reality of
recurring instability. 12
From era to era, an ongoing cottage industry of exploitation has
persisted where predatory entrepreneurs set up colorably legal
operations to exploit weaknesses, subvert well-intentioned programs,
and create an alternative universe of a market that destroys its
participants. This universe includes people who range from the
innocent, ill-informed, overly trusting, educated-but-tricked, to the
defrauded or the VlctlffiS of outright theft through forgery.
Consequently, the stability that undergirds property and is prized by all
is unavailable to many. The resulting persistent instability experienced
by Blacks and Latinos during the subprime crisis, but particularly by
Blacks over time, signals a need to view this issue through a lens of
recurring exploitation that is likely endemic to contractual relations.
And, just as this instability is spatially located in places identified by
race and class, it is structurally located within property doctrine. As
property doctrine has evolved away from old common law forms of
action,13 from very limited interpretations of rights and obligations of
seller to buyer,14 landlord to tenant,15 and neighbor to neighbor,t6 the
doctrine has consistently incorporated contractual terms and standards
to facilitate alienation and support markets for real estate. I?
12.
MONIQUE W. MORRIS, NAT'L ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE, DISCRIMINATION AND MORTGAGE LENDING IN AMERICA: A SUMMARY OF THE
DISPARATE IMPACT OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING ON AFRICAN AMERICANS 2-3
(2009) ("Nationwide, African Americans are homeowners at a rate of 47.2 percent,
compared to 75.2 percent for ... non-Hispanic white[s]. However, this rate declined by
nearly two percentage points between 2004 and 2007, as many African American
homeowners have been unable to keep their homes during the mortgage crisis, largely
as a result of predatory lending .... [A] recent study by Freddie Mac reveals that one
in five subprime loan recipients could have received a lower-cost prime loan."
(footnotes omitted».
13.
See, e.g., William H. Lloyd, Pleamng, 71 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 26-36
(1922-23) (discussing common law pleading); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleamng
Equa{jon, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 90, 109-14 (2009) (briefly discussing history of U.S.
pleading).
14.
E.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817) (adopting caveat emptor);
27A AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 1 (2011) (discussing equitable conversion).
15.
See, e.g., Frank F. Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for
Change, 44 DENV. L.J. 387, 387 (1967) ("In the early development of cases concerning
real property leases, the courts applied the strict limitations of property law and
determined that no implied covenants regarding fitness of the premises for a purpose or
habitation existed in a lease.").
16.
See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
17.
In the landlord-tenant context, the contractual terms were instituted to
fulfill substantive principles of fairness or good behavior. The landlord-tenant standards
are the high watermark for incorporating business standards with a hand on the scale
towards eliminating the structural bias in property doctrine for the landlord and evening
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This Article proposes an inquiry into the instability of property
ownership, in particular the interaction of pervasive predatory real
estate arrangements with property doctrine's unquestioned policy
decision to facilitate property markets by promoting alienation. 18 While
property's move to reject "restraints on alienation,,19 and away from
dead-hand control of land has been beneficial, there has been an
unacknowledged cost from inadequate protections against predatory
behavior that are directed persistently against Black property owners.
By providing endless opportunities for fragmentation of ownership by
virtue of fmancing and the multiplicity of loan terms/o recording act
presumptions in favor of purchasers over owners21 (thus, in effect,
accepting that a certain amount of fraud is inevitable), and formalism in
the common law that ignores the exploitative substance of certain real
estate transactions, property doctrine not only facilitates markets but
also facilitates exploitation. In particular, these presumptions and policy
goals ignore the embeddedness of racism, classism, and predatory
behavior in bargaining. In order to rebut this predatory behavior, we
need to theorize a more precise and robust notion of an under-theorized
stick in the metaphorical bundle of property rights: the right to be free
from expropriation. 22 Building on the existing but underdeveloped
recognition of this stick allows us to consider when and where and
under what circumstances a property owner should have a protected
"right to keep" their land. This is important in light of the importation
of contract and market principles to better meet the needs of all types of
property owners by creating protections within the currently accepted
preset categories that resist and neutralize the effects of predatory

the playing field. Nonetheless, those insights are largely confined to landlord and
tenant, and some would argue do not go far enough. See generally David Super, The
Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty ofHabitability, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 389 (2011).
18.
See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community through
Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 50S, 554-55 (2001)
(suggesting that the rule against restraints on alienation serves a democratic political
purpose of "[s]ubjecting wealth concentrated in the hands of dynastic families to market
pressures [thus] promot[ing] democratic ends").
19.
See infra Part LB.3.
20.
See infra Part LB.2.
21.
See infra Part LB.4.
22.
Joseph Singer notes, "[p]roperty owners have the right not to have their
property taken or damaged by others against their will." JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xlv (5th ed. 2010); see also Joseph
William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,
90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1451 (1996) [hereinafter Public Accommodations] ("[T]he
right of all persons to contract and to acquire property entitles members of the public to
enter the market on an equal basis. ").
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behavior and recognize the special place of home to a poor or workingclass person. 23
In Part I, I discuss the stability paradigm and the lessons it
provides about our common ideals for property. In Part II, I discuss the
reality of instability and the lessons we learn from the patterns of land
loss and methods of divestment. In Part III, I discuss how property
doctrine's incorporation of market logic and a policy presumption in
favor of alienation also facilitates instability. I conclude by arguing that
in order to vindicate stability's promise, we must acknowledge this
inherent contradiction, hold our common law understandings to higher
standards, and put substantive teeth into anti-fraud provisions to protect
the integrity and availability of property ownership for all.
I.

STABILITY IN PROPERTY LAW

A. The Stability Paradigm in Property
In its most general sense, the meaning of property ownership
arises from the relation of an individual to a perceived thing, and the
virtue and significance of property is the control it affords over
resources. 24 The concept of stability plays a powerful role in how we
experience that control-how we define its parameters and deploy legal
protection for the boundaries of what we understand property
ownership to be. Though there is an extensive and robust debate over
what property is-whether it is best conceived as an absolute, inviolable
thing;25 a thing distinguishable by whether it is personal or fungible;26 a
thing of natural law, 27 social relations,28 status,29 political institution, 30

23.
See BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS 42
(1990) ("Despite the brutal reality of racial apartheid, of domination, one's homeplace
was the one site where one could freely confront the issue of humanization, where one
could resist. Black women resisted by making homes where all black people could
strive to be subjects, not objects, where we could be affirmed in our minds and hearts
despite poverty, hardship, and deprivation, where we could restore to ourselves the
dignity denied to us on the outside in the public world. "). But see Tanya D. Marsh,
Sometimes Blackacre Is a Widget: Rethinking Commercial Real Estate Contract
Remedies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 635 (2010).
24.
See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175,
2187-88, 2198 (1997).

25.
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *140-41 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 2001) (1793).
26.
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 53-55 (1993).
27.
See JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-95 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690) (describing state of nature); id. at
303-20 (describing labor's role in creating property rights).
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or intergenerational conflict; 31 or whether the sticks-in-the-bundle
metaphor for defining property is the bese2 or the worst thing that ever
happened to property33 -there is little debate that the underlying
purpose and goal of property law is to promote and support stability. 34
Stability clearly signifies an easily supportable and desirable principle,
yet the concept has rarely been explored in depth. Particularly in light
28.
Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations, in PROPERTY AND
VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRNATE OWNERSHIP 3, 8-11 (Charles Geisler &
Gail Daneker eds., 2000); see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Nonn in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 774 (2009) ("[A]n owner is
morally obligated to provide to the society of which the individual is a member those
benefits that the society reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing. ");
Joseph William Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted' Minimum
Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. &
POL' Y REv. 139 passim (2008).
29.
See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107
MICH. L. REv. 757 (2009).
30.
See generally Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987
(2008). Under this conception, public institutions are the best allocators of property, not
private actors. ld at 1991.
Gerald Korngold, Resolving The lntergenerational Conflicts of Real
31.

Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future
Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 1525 (2007).
32.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
129 (1928) (acknowledging a bundle of rights that can be assembled into particular
arrangements of correlative rights); WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: As ApPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 10-14 (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., Greenwood Press 1978) (jural relations as precursor to bundle-of-rights metaphor);
K. N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv.

159 (1938).
33.
See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix
Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 239, 307 (1994) ("The enlightened realists killed title by shattering it. Shattered
property was disaggregated into a bundle of sticks. ").
34.
See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q.
8, 15-16 (1928) (arguing that protecting possession promotes "human economy" by
"mak[ing] for certainty and security of transaction as well as for public peace");
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2097 (1997) (arguing that property rules are intrinsic to
support "stability of possession ... recognized as one of the dominant rules of
society. "); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, llO YALE L.J. 1,63-64, 66-67 (2000)
(identifying the common law's recognition of a limited number of types of real property
as tending to promote stability and arguing that the cost and expense of legislative
changes to those rules also promote stability by minimizing the frequency of changes
and avoiding the common law's piecemeal approach); Rose, supra note 24, at 2187-88,
2197-98 (noting the purpose of a system of property ownership is to promote
"individual investment, planning, and effort" and to encourage parties to learn to
bargain with each other).
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of the current foreclosure CrISIS and its racialized dimensions, it is
worth considering what exactly stability means and why it is and should
be valued. 35

35.
This question reflects the debate over what is property. The debate over
what property means or should mean is an ongoing one, both in academic literature as
well as in the implicit conflicting assumptions animating legal disputes over competing
claims to property. See, e.g., BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON
LAISSEZ FAlRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 15-25
(1998); Grey, supra note 33, at 69. Thus the ownership and title concept has been
nearly successfully challenged by the "sticks in the bundle" metaphor. Examples of
cases using the term "sticks in the bundle" include: United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.
274, 278 (2002) ("A common idiom describes property as a 'bundle of sticks '-a
collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property. ");
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) ("To
borrow a metaphor, the government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the
'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand. "
(citation omitted»; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("The
Government contends that as a result of one of these improvements, the pond's
connection to the navigable water in a manner approved by the Corps of Engineers, the
owner has somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others. "); Severance v.
Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 512 (5th Cir. 2009) ("It is the Fifth Amendment, then ... that
ensures that the State must respect private property by curtailing the purpose for which
the State may take (be it title, physical possession, or some crucial stick from the
bundle of property rights), and requiring that when the State does take, it pay for the
privilege. "); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("We determine whether an asserted right is one of the rights in the
bundle of sticks of property rights that inheres in a res by looking to 'existing rules or
understandings' and 'background principles' derived from an independent source such
as state, federal, or common law." (quoting Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1030 (1992»); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1577 (10th Cir.
1995) ("When viewed in the context of Plaintiffs' entire bundle of property rights
(rather than solely on their assumed right to hunt), Section 3 does not effect a
destruction of all beneficial use of Plaintiffs' 'parcel as a whole' because Plaintiffs still
can 'use their property for ranching, farming, and other livestock operations. '"
(quoting Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 852 n.14 (D. Wyo. 1994)));
AMCO Ins. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
("As the Lauren-Spencer Defendants correctly point out, Harris' property rights are a
bundle of rights and include the right to preclude others from advertising his images
(even if misappropriated)."); In re Las Torres Dev., L.L.c., 408 B.R. 876, 887
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) ("This is especially true where, as here, the Debtor is still in
possession of the Rents because bare possession, alone, constitutes one stick in the
bundle of sticks that comprise property rights. "); In re Jackson, No. 05-64536, 2006
WL 3064087, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2006) ("This argument, however,
confuses two twigs in the 'bundle of sticks' that comprise property rights. Ownership
and security interests are separate components, although they frequently overlap or
intertwine. "); Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 100 (2005) ("Courts often
turned to tort concepts to define the scope of property rights that comprise the bundle of
sticks. In a sense, the law of property and tort are oft intertwined. Courts rely on the
tort of trespass to establish one of the 'sticks' in an owner's bundle-the right to
exclude."); Heath v. Parker, 30 P.3d 746, 750 (Colo. App. 2000) ("To the contrary,
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In its most literal sense, stability could be interpreted to be fulfilled
only when property is non-transferable; that is, in an absolutely stable
system, property would never leave the hands of the current owner. 36
Thus, in the old English common law tradition, the vision for stability
of ownership was vindicated by securing familial wealth through
protection, almost exclusively, of intergenerational transfer. 37 The
practice of primogeniture and entailment were two old common law
devices that certainly secured stability, albeit in ways with significant
costS. 38 Today, absolute stability has long been rejected because it leads
to family dynasties. Instead, property utilizes an intermediate
approach-qualified stability, which (1) seeks to satisfy the desire for
access to acquiring property through property markets and (2) assumes
that the "owner" holds the property as long as he or she desires. 39
These features of property ownership provide a psychologically and
materially steadying feeling of guaranteed protection against change. 40
This stability of expectations around property ownership is considered
the foundation of the operation of a democracy; it reflects underlying

however, reasonable surface use, including access, is part of the 'bundle of sticks' of
mineral claim property rights, including unpatented claims. "); Mitchell Aero, Inc. v.
City of Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 168 N.W.2d 183 (1969) ("Ownership is
often referred to in legal philosophy as a bundle of sticks or rights and one or more of
the sticks may be separated from the bundle and the bundle will still be considered
ownership .... In this case for exemption one needs more than the title stick to
constitute ownership. ").
36.
See Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American
Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 300 (1991) ("Property-Iandneeded to be unencumbered to avoid privilege and inequality, but it also had to be
stable-that is, non-transferable-to avoid being reduced to a mere commodity, the
object of acquisitive pursuit that would destroy republican virtue. ").
37.
See id. at 296 (comparing the ability to maintain family dynasties in
America and England).
38.
Id. at 297-99 (describing the antipathy and rejection of these devices in
early American political thought even though their use and effect was not widespread as
it was in England).
39.
Epstein, supra note 34, at 2097 ("Thus, transactions take place only if
both sides agree to them, which means that all individuals keep their holdings until they
agree to part with them. "); Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New
Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible
to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 190 (2005) ("Americans
think of buying a home as a way to build stability-one that provides ... a guaranteed
place to live for years to come (as long as the mortgage payments are met) .... ").
40.
See John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74
TENN. L. REV. 463 (2006).
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principles of equality in the ability to acquire, use, enjoy, and exercise
the decision to alienate. 41
1. THE COMPONENTS OF STABILITY: PREDICTABILITY AND CERTAINTY
a. Value

Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky argue that a central value
of a system of property ownership is the goal of stability because "the
central feature of property-[is] its function as a device for capturing
and retaining certain kinds of value .... ,,42 This consequentialist
argument is consistent with most justifications for property: the
justifications are neither intrinsically moral nor inherent but are
pragmatically instrumental, measured by the contribution to social
utility.43 This seems somewhat odd, since the fierceness and passion
that surrounds property ownership suggests more of an intrinsic moral
foundation than mere consequentialist justification. 44 While instrumental
definitions are less morally satisfying,45 according to Emily Sherwin:
the ... many well-known justifications for legal protection of
private property rights ... can be divided roughly into rightbased theories, in which property rights rest directly on the
moral rights of individual owners, and instrumental theories,

41.
See Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L.
REv. 907, 911-13 (1993) (explaining property rights' functional value in terms of
promoting stability of expectations and thus incentivizing development of resources).
42.
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV 531,536 (2005).
43.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1849 (2007). But see Emily Sherwin, Three
Reasons W7Jy Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1927, 1936, 1939, 1943-44 (2007) (identifying some limits of the morality of
property as being the determinacy of rules causing them to sometimes diverge from
their underlying moral purpose, the problem of rules taking on a moral life of their own
over time; ideals of justice-retributive, corrective and distributive-working at crosspurposes).
44.
See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LiBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 55, 172,
175 (2d ed. 1998) (arguing in favor of intrinsic deontological justifications as superior
to consequentialist justifications).
45.
Though property rights raise strong feelings and a sense of intrinsic
morality, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 43, at 1856 ("Some work by modern
cognitive scientists suggests that gross violations of property rights trigger reactions in
parts of the brain devoted to automatic emotions .... "), the justifications for property
rights are largely instrumental.
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in which property rights are justified by their good
consequences. 46
As a practical matter, it may be difficult to extend intrinsic, moral
justifications to property in general. It is likely that moral justifications
are easier in some contexts than in others. Sherwin suggests that, while
moral justifications for property within the human body are easily
connected to intrinsic endowments arising from being a human being,
our general understandings of property seem to make most sense when
conceived of as being based on social relationships.47 Thus, it is
practical to consider stability of property ownership as being comprised
of internally overlapping key features: stability of values stems from
predictability of relationships between people. Accordingly, Bell and
Parchomovsky's explanation of stability is relational: "[p]roperty law
both recognizes and helps create stable relationships between persons
and assets, allowing owners to extract utility that is otherwise
unavailable. ,,48 Though it perhaps sounds a bit circular, in a sense,
social utility and thus social welfare are promoted because individuals
fmd them, for lack of a better term, individually and interpersonally
useful.
b. Retention ofpossession

Perhaps the key component of the utility of stability's
predictability, however, is the ability to retain ownership as long as the
property owner desires. For example, it is recognized that: "[L]egal
enforcement of property rights should increase the property owner's
probability of retaining possession of her property . . .. The heightened
protection effected by legal enforcement makes it less likely that current
owners would involuntarily lose their assets. ,,49

46.
Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1075, 1080 (1997).
47.
Id at 1086 ("[W]ithout a preestablished [sic] legal connection between
person and thing, relations between people in regard to things dissolve into questions of
what is best in each case. ").
48.
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 42, at 537-38 (footnote omitted)
("[V]alue is synonymous with utility or welfare as used in the field of welfare
economics. ").
49.
Id. at 555; see also id. at 562 & n.164 (citing works that empirically
support the view "that long-term economic growth is intimately tied with the creation
and defense of stable property rights," including, Hernando de Soto, Preface to THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT, at xiii (Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997)
("Those nations that have succeeded in developing a market-oriented economy are not
coincidentally those that have recognized the need for and secured widespread property
rights protected by just law. ")); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
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In other words, ownership explicitly promises or suggests a right
not to be unwarrantedly dispossessed. 50 Typically our notion of
unwarranted dispossession is based on certain underlying assumptions.
First, we assume that dispossession is a rare thing; second, that the
threat of dispossession comes from a stranger with no relationship or
colorable claim to the property; and third, dispossession will only take
place when justified based on a legitimate claim. The current wave of
foreclosures challenges traditional notions of the types of dispossession
that are warranted. Particularly, with destruction of entire
neighborhoods in some cities from foreclosures,5! the quantity calls for
attention to the factors that contribute to interfering with one's ability to
retain possession of one's property.
c. Development
Law and development theorists echo the importance and value of
stability in the international development context. These theorists posit
that stable property ownership is the predicate, and the first step, to
promoting market-based economic growth and development. 52 The
United States is lauded for its stable system of property rights that has

Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (2001)
("The ... results ... suggest that the strong association between secure property and
contract rights and growth is causal, and not simply a consequence of simultaneity. ");
Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON.
REv., Nov. 2002, at 22 ("The documented effect of increasing rule of law values on
economic growth is robust. Individuals are more willing to invest in economic growth
where property rights are stable .... "); Dani Rodrick, Institutions for High-Quality
Growth: U1Jat They Are and How to Acquire Them 5 (Nat' I Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7540, 2000) ("[E]stablishment of secure and stable
property rights [was] a key element in the rise of the West and the onset of modem
economic growth. ").
50.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (1979).
51.
See Bob Paynter, Quick Resales Heat Housing Market, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Aug. 27, 2000, at lA (describing the impact of foreclosures on
neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio).
52.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastem Front, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 555, 569 (1991) ("Within the context of Eastern Europe, property and
economic protections are critical to the ability to tum nations and economies around
from central planning to private ordering. The key elements are stability and
permanence of the property rights structure. "); Christopher T. Ruder, Comment,
Individual Economic Rights under the New Russian Constitution: A Practical
Framework For Competitive Capita/ism or Mere Theoretical Exercise!?, 39 ST. LoUIS
U. L.J. 1429, 1444 (1995) ("The ... goal of many Eastern European countries ... [is]
to establish a constitutional system that is amenable to the development of competitive
capitalism. The foundation of such a constitutional system rests on two broad
objectives: the creation of stable and permanent property rights (which implicates the
protection of other economic rights) .... " (footnote omitted».
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made it an attractive site for investment. The aspect of the U.S. system
that these theorists likely hope to replicate elsewhere is the seeming
general truth that expectations are settled and that neither the
government nor other individuals generally appropriates without paying
compensation. 53 Also, transfers between individuals largely take part
through arms-length transactions that are initiated and consummated
with regularity and certainty. 54 Thus, the central value and assumption
of stability in any country desiring investment is that if an "owner" is
unlawfully dispossessed, the system will, in theory at least, reinstate
you. 55 Accordingly, stability of property rights and contract rights are
necessary to support the market economy and encourage people to
make investments. 56

d. Identity
But is there more to stability than its utility for market-based
economic growth? According to Margeret Radin's most well-known
insights about property, stability has a more profound meaning. 57 Her
insights teach us that the stability heralded in property doctrine is about
how we constitute ourselves and maintain our identity by holding onto
those things that we value. Radin's work demonstrates that the
instrumental concept that the purpose of stability in social utility is
unduly narrow and limited. It does not reflect the true nature of human

53.
See DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND
THE ROLE OF LAW 48-50 (2007) (noting that financial markets flourish "in countries
where legal systems enforce property rights, support private contractual arrangements,
and protect the legal rights of investors").
54.
But see Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case
Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 76-78 (2007)
(arguing that this standardized system of exchange does not work efficiently in the case
of homeownership for the poor); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Squatters, Pirates, and
Entrepreneurs: Is Infonnality the Solution to the Urban Housing Crisis?, 40 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 239, 247-51 (2008) (critiquing misplaced assumptions about the
curative effects of formal property rights and market-based prescriptions, advanced by
proponents like Hernando de Soto, as exacerbating the crisis of affordable housing in
Latin America).
55.
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 42, at 588-90 (discussing
enforcement of property rights); see also Colin Moynihan, Long Fight to Reclaim
House Stolen in Wave of Pen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2011, at A17 (describing difficulty
and expense of unraveling deed theft and other mortgage fraud schemes).
56.
Gregory Scott Crespi, Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: An Austrian
Approach to the Economic Analysis of Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 315, 336 (1997);
Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese
Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 551, 557
(2009).
57.
See generally RADIN, supra note 26.
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attachment to objects and land, and it places value that is significant
even though it is not acknowledged in market valuations. This is
consistent with the layperson's perspective of why property stability is
important. Not only do ordinary people want the property and need to
be encouraged to invest, they also want to be sure upon inheritance or
gift that the property will still be theirs. The stability of that ownership
will be the basis of every other aspect of decision-making and living in
the person's life. As Radin's personality theory of property teaches us,
the concept of "ownership" is a crucial aspect of how we constitute
ourselves and our identity. 58

e. Ownership and decision-making power
Debates over the proper theoretical understanding of property
ownership take place largely in the background as the everyday
business of landownership proceeds un-self-consciously, full of the
noted contradiction and tension, both opaque and contested, yet clear as
a beacon or symbol in the minds and hearts of ordinary people. Most
"owners" perceive and experience a world of stable, predictable
property ownership with access to all of the major and the minor sticks
in the bundle. 59 They use, possess, and enjoy control over things and
places, all with the ability to exclude others from entering the premises.
A property owner also may alienate the property at will, either by
leaving it to whomever he or she chooses by testamentary will or inter
vivos transfer. 60 Most will sell to strangers in arms-lengths transactions
guided by a real estate agent for most of the process, with few choosing
to use an attorney to handle closing the deal. 61 The terms and
procedures are standardized, and the process seems largely
predictable. 62

58.
ld. at l.
59.
One of the earliest uses of this metaphor was by Benjamin N. Cardozo:
"The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not
constant through the ages. The [sticks] must be put together and rebound from time to
time." CARDOZO, supra note 32, at 129.
60.
See generallyCharies J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in
the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 221, 263-64 (1995) (noting that the right
of free alienation was the inadvertent result of a failed effort to preserve feudalism).
61.
See generally Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and InterProfessional Competitive Advantage: An Example Drawn from Residential Real Estate
Conveyancing, 62 Mo. L. REv. 241 (1997) (exploring the shifting roles of real estate
brokers and attorneys in residential real estate transactions).
62.
ld. at 247. Although the possibility for complications from unforeseen
defects are numerous, these problems are usually out of sight and thus out of mind for
the ordinary property seller and purchaser.
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For ordinary people, property ownership is a combination of
control over both access to material value, and as a result, constituting
one's personal identity, personal sovereignty, and harbor in the storm. 63
The fundamental underlying expectation is that in a shifting world of
uncertainty or certain change there are some things that are fixed and
unshakable.64 Thus, the source of the stability image that property
enjoys arises from people's expectations and represents a vision of
individual sovereignty. These are rights that are fixed, unchangeable,
and almost arising preternaturally out of natural law. The stability
image also is the basis for the illusion of ownership-a collective
illusion in which we all participate-that you have control, that you
should be left alone in your right to claim an object or a thing as
something that you alone control, and you will decide when to transfer
the property holding on for as long or as short as you like.

2.

STABILITY'S UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DYNAMIC OF CHANGE

Margaret Radin's work contains another important insight about
stability, different yet equally profound, that allows us to peer more
closely at the contradictions within the concept. In particular, how does
the stability concept incorporate the value of "change," which seems a
necessary silent partner in a market-based economy? How is the ability
to change ownership readily incorporated without disrupting stability's
reputation as the dominant image of property? According to Radin,
property works in tandem with "freedom of contract" to promote the
ability to change: "'property' is the classical liberal instantiation of the
need for stability of contexts, and 'freedom of contract' is the classical
liberal instantiation of the need for context-flexibility. The mythology
of property expresses rootedness, and the mythology of contract
expresses mutability. ,,65 Thus, Radin makes clear that stability in
property ownership is a means to the end of ourselves and our
perceptions about reality, which property says can be fixed for as long
as we like but which contract allows us to also make willfully mutable.
Also recognizing the concept of change in relation to property
ownership, Gregory Alexander observes that early American republican
63.
See generally CLARE COOPER MARCUS, HOUSE AS A MIRROR OF SELF:
EXPLORING THE DEEPER MEANING OF HOME 3-4, 107 (1995) (exploring how the selfimage is reflected in our homes); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982) (positing that individuals achieve proper self-development
through property rights).
64.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 34, at 66 ("Stability and change represent
well-known tradeoffs in any legal system, and a system that scores high on stability is
likely for that very reason to be slow to change. ").
65.
RADIN, supra note 26, at 24.
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theorists were quite conscious of a tension between the principle of
stability (i.e., non-transferability) and the need for a certain dynamism
in property (i.e., that some transfer was necessary).66 Today, we take
that dynamism, by virtue of the principle of free alienation, for granted.
Yet the concern for stability exists alongside this need for dynamism
with the recognition that it is not an absolute, strict principle or value.
Instead, the quest for stability has shifted to a more symbolic meaning
that relates to expectations, an overall sense of wellbeing, stable
property values, and predictability. The understanding is that literal,
absolute stability promotes a static condition that is ultimately
unproductive and destructive of society. According to Alexander, there
is an inherent "dialectic of stability and change in property" that
continues to this day as "how to regulate land ownership to avoid both
hierarchy and over-commercialization .... ,,67 Thus, in the transition
from the pre-modem to the modem, from cultural connectedness to
property, through concerns of what one generation owed the next, to
property as a pure commodity, stability had a particular meaning and
the dynamism of the market presented both opportunity and threat. 68
Stability represented adherence to shared traditions and a
sense of one's place in the social order. Dynamism
represented individual capacity to break free of stifling social
conventions and entrenched hierarchies. Stability and
dynamism, tradition and fluidity, embeddedness and
uniqueness: though differently articulated, these sets of
antinomies reflect cultural anxiety that we can now see as
linked together. 69
The internal tension within property, therefore, arises from the
conceptual and relational tug between the reality of property as a nonfungible important thing and property as an exchangeable commodity. 70
While alienation is widely considered to promote individual
freedom and the creation of wealth,71 it is well noted that "the freetransferability policy .... [presents an under-considered] social
dilemma that commodifying all assets in the name of freedom of the

Alexander, supra note 36, at 300.
Id at 316.
Id at 278.
69.
Id at 277.
70.
Id. at 277-78.
71.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of The Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 111115 (1972); Richard A. Epstein, My Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970,
971-72 (1985).
66.
67.
68.
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market creates the risk of social exploitation within market relations.,,72
C.B. Macpherson called this faith in the market and the belief in its
absolute desirability "possessive individualism. ,,73 Under this notion,
the only function of property is based on a concept of it as belonging to
the private realm and a protection against the tyranny of the public
interest, community, or government. According to Macpherson, the
culture of possessive individualism plays a nearly invisible ideological
role of obscuring the role and naturalizing the impact of markets on
individuals. 74 Thus, what has been lost in modern property doctrine is
any recognition or understanding that the dynamism of alienation also is
the dynamism of instability. This instability is tacitly acknowledged, but
inadequately so. Instability is ultimately unproductive for some because
of the inherent opportunity and human taste for exploitation. Without
open acknowledgment and management, this instability tends to destroy
the same recurring groups of people in society: those who are poor in
financial means or transactional sophistication and lack accepted ingroup membership (e.g., some members ofracial minorities).75
Because the policy of free alienation permeates modern property
doctrine,76 transactions-not family or personal relationships-are at the
heart of modern property-doctrine policy. Nevertheless, a variety of
accepted doctrines facilitate change within property law, which all
combine to support the transactional vision at the heart of property's
embrace of markets. Not only does the "sticks in the bundle"
metaphoe7 reflect and support this transactional vision of property, but
also the doctrine against restraints on alienation frees property. It
essentially limits a grantor's ability to strip away an owner's decision-

72.
Alexander, supra note 36, at 294 n.78.
73.
Id. at 286 (quoting C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962) (arguing that the culture of
possessive individualism plays a nearly invisible ideological role of obscuring the role
and impact of markets on people)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8-9 (1963) (arguing that capitalism leads to
political freedom).
74.
See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDNIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 266 (1962).
See Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi, & Richard K. Green, Forced
75.
Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the "Double Discount", 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589
(2010).
76.
See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997);
Joan Williams, Recovering the Full Complexity of Our Traditions: New Developments
in Property Theory, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 598 (1996).
77.
See e.g., Kaiser Aema v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)
(recognizing the "bundle of sticks" metaphor).
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making power to transfer property. 78 Additionally, the system of
recording acts facilitates alienation and a particular vision of property
markets by prioritizing the bona fide purchaser over a true owner, even
when he or she may have been tricked or defrauded out of his or her
home. 79 Ironically, this means that recording acts may in some
instances protect some of our worst inclinations. 80
B. Implementing Stability

As a practical matter, a stable system of property ownership is a
system that everyone believes in, honors, and enforces. Because a
fundamental predicate for a system of property is the widespread
distribution of ownership, 81 there are underlying practices that are also
part of implementing stability. In order to facilitate distribution, these
practices relate to physical and conceptual division and allocation of
those things intended to be property.
1.

FRAGMENTATION

As a physical or spatial matter, the principle of widespread
distribution is reflected in longstanding practices forming our system of
land development, which involves subdivision of large estates into
smaller parcels,82 making ownership accessible to the ordinary person.
Physical fragmentation is obviously necessary fodder for a system
promoting alienation to fulfill the general goal of widespread
ownership.
Also key to the system of ownership has been the conceptual
fragmentation of ownership and the disaggregation of the aspects of
such ownership. The well-known metaphor of the sticks in the bundle
78.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 76, at 288-89 (explaining development of the
policy explicitly recognizing the "principle of freedom of owners to dispose of their
property as they wished").
79.
See John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: A Recording Acts Guide
for First Year Law Students, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 91, 103-04 (2002).
80.
See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv.
577,585-90 (1988) (discussing recording acts representing unsuccessful efforts to make
crystalline rules that were then muddied by the courts attempting to the adjust them for
the realities of human imperfection).
See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
81.
PROPERTY 141 (2000) ("Widespread distribution of property is virtually a defIping
characteristic of private property systems-or at least the norms that justify such
systems. "). See generally Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea ofProperty, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1319 (1987).
82.
See, e.g., 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 423 (2011) (describing
subdivision regulation).
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of property rights is at once a problematic yet helpful way to conceive
of and delineate aspects of basic concepts of ownership. 83 It is helpful
because it articulates the specific aspect of possession that is at stake in
any particular exchange or dispute. 84 The bundle-of-rights metaphor
was introduced as a response to the traditional definition of ownership
as sovereignty85 and to instead allow us to better delineate the precise
dimensions of what is protected by virtue of being "property." The
sticks force us to crystallize what property is versus what it is not. As
long as the structure of property doctrine is justified by an underlying
promise of stability and likely predictability, people will continue to
cling to the absolute sovereignty vision of property because the view
represents a bulwark against the social relations that seem to dictate a
disadvantageous pattern of allocating and distributing the stability
throughout the system.
The metaphor can be problematic, however, because it
disaggregates aspects of ownership to the point where anything and
everything is a property right, and the infinite possibilities86 mean the

83.
See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS:
As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 30 (1923); J.E. Penner,
The Bundle ofRights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996).
84.
I do not agree that the right to exclude is the most important stick in the
bundle. Instead, the right to possess is most important. The right to exclude is a
necessary negative corollary or aspect of possession. It cannot be the most important
right, however, because without any others, one has very few rights-it cannot stand on
its own. The most important aspects of ownership, then, are those that can stand on
their own.
85.
See generally David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian,
10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103 (2009) (exploring the paradox of Blackstone being
associated both with the sovereignty notion of property as well as the bundle of sticks
metaphor).
86.
A fee simple absolute entitles the owner to the three primary sticks:
possession, alienation, and use and enjoyment. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal and the
Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, in LAW AND THE
POSTMODERN MIND 99, 106-09 (1998) (arguing that the only three sticks that matter in
the bundle of sticks metaphor are possession, use, and alienation). Each stick in the
bundle is independent and does not affect the remaining legally recognized interests.
See James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail,
and Insider Trading, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 1413, 1512 (1992). Boyle's view is designed to
contrast with the supposedly classical view of "title."
To the extent that there was a replacement for this Blackstonian conception
it was the familiar 'bundle of rights' notion of modem property law, a
vulgarization of Hohfeld's analytic scheme of jural correlates and opposites,
loosely justified by a rough-and-ready utilitarianism and applied in widely
varying ways to legal interest of every kind.
ld. at 1459. The validity of the bundle-of-sticks metaphor has been the source of a
robust debate. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
26-29, 97-100 (1977); Grey, supra note 33, at 76-79; Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
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sum of each naked stick can add up to being greater than the whole. 87
The notion also inaccurately suggests distinctness when the rights are
all tied to each other and represent protection and support of different
distinctly human interests. 88 This obscures the reality that the
interrelated dimensions of ownership (i.e., rights) represent different
contextual policy choices at different times. As the times change, the
policy choices and concerns must change as well. 89 Little thought is
given to how the policies of free alienation supported by property
facilitate dispossession in light of the realities of modem systems of real
estate fmance, real estate ownership documentation, and the prevalence
of predatory behavior.

Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities
Controlled by Intennediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 305 (1990); James Steven Rogers,
Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 471 (1990); Joseph L. Sax,
Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481 (1983);
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611
(1988); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325 (1980); see
also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1687-88 (1988) (property should
be understood in ways that further "human flourishing"); Joseph William Singer & Jack
M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 241 (1993)
(because property is socially constructed, it must be defined in ways that are good for
people). Jeanne Schroeder argues that the bundle of sticks metaphor was meant to deny
that property is a physical object, but by using a physical metaphor of sticks, its
proponents merely disassemble the object into smaller objects. Schroeder, supra note
33, at 243. The result is that the metaphor expands property concerns to everything,
which threatens to tum all governmental actions into takings. Id. at 243-44 ("Thanks to
'bundle of sticks' imagery, property threatens to permeate all legal relations, making all
government actions into takings. ").
87.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)
("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. "); RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 57-62 (1985) (arguing for distinct recognition of each aspect of
property as a property right); Merrill & Smith, supra note 34, at 33-36, 63-64 (arguing
that the standardization of property rights would act as a counterweight to contract's
endless combinations of rights by providing preset recognized categories); Radin, supra
note 86, at 1675-78 (arguing against conceptual severance).
88.
See Schroeder, supra note 33, at 245-46 ("Human beings are driven by an
erotic desire for mutual recognition. 'Property is ... a moment in man's struggle for
recognition.' ... Only through the possession and enjoyment of objects does the
abstract person become individualized and thereby recognizable as a subject."
(footnotes omitted) (quoting SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE
89 (1972»).
89.
See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1403,
1404 (2009) ("[E]xplor[ing] inalienability rules as tools for achieving efficiency or
other ends when applied to resources that society generally views as appropriate objects
of market transactions. ").
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THE ELUSIVE FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE

Through centuries of adjustment and refmement from the feudal
era to the industrial era90 to the new service economy, the system of
estates has evolved to have the fee simple absolute as the symbolic
centerpiece of a system of land ownership with a limited number of
additional predefined categories of ownership. Most noteworthy is the
modernizing of the fee simple absolute to make it the default estate,
supplanting the prior common law favorite, the life estate. The fee
simple absolute estate is more consistent with our transactional reality
and presumptive life estates for technical defects in formal language of
conveyances would only muck up the otherwise seamlessly smooth
system of transfer that exists. The basic rules of property teach that the
owner has a fee simple absolute, unless the grantor explicitly dictates a
lesser estate, using only special, legally cognizable, magic words. 91
To own land and declare "I have a fee simple" communicates
everything about what we want land ownership to be. 92 The estate
promises that one owns everything for as long as the person wants.
Because the fee simple absolute is property's crown jewel, it is
responsible for some of our current expectations and thus dilemmas of
property.
The reality is that few homeowners actually have a fee simple
absolute. Acquiring a home is a three-way transaction among buyer,

90.
See generally Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A
Transfonnation of Concurrent Ownership for Modem Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REv.
423, 433-35 (2001) (recounting the early history of the joint tenancy as the default
tenancy in case of ambiguity and the rise of the tenancy in common as a way to
characterize a co-ownership arrangement that failed to meet the requirements of the
default tenancy: joint tenancy); Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the Time of the
Black Death, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 507, 558 (2003) (noting the evolution of
feudal law rejecting transfer by subinfeudation to transfer by substitution leading to "the
establishment of 'a capitalist free market in the land'" (quoting NORMAN F. CANTOR, IN
THE WAKE OF THE PLAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH AND THE WORLD IT MADE 69 (2001»).
91.
SINGER, supra note 22, at 505-06.
92.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, W1Iat Happened to Property in
Law and Economics?, 111 YALEL. 1. 357, 359 (2001) ("Because property rights create
duties that attach to 'everyone else,' they provide a basis of security that permits people
to develop resources and plan for the future .... As a consequence, property is required
to come in standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low cost. This
feature of property-that it comes in a fixed, mandatory menu of forms, in contrast to
contracts that are far more customizable-constitutes a deep design principle of the law
that is rarely articulated explicitly. ").
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seller, and financier. 93 Ownership is often acquired through mortgage
fmancing, where the "owner" grants away some of the decision-making
power and control over the property to the fmancing entity, which has
the power to force divestment should the purchaser default. 94 At best, a
typical homeowner has the equivalent of a fee simple subject to an
executory limitation. That means some person can divest the
homeowner sometime in the future. Because the entitlement to receive
payment under the loan can be resold many times over and ultimately
end up in a collateralized debt obligation vehicle, backing securities
whose value depends on the guaranteed stream of income based on
anticipated payments due under the loan,95 the fee simple absolute,
already an arcane term, does not even begin to communicate the
complexity of ownership interests reflected in a residential real estate
transaction. 96
This fragmentation of ownership is accepted as supporting stability
by providing access to ownership. While it seems that our system of
property is intended for everyone to enjoy stable predictability of
ownership, the fee simple absolute that potentially endures forever is
actually temporary for some. For those who fail to make their
payments, it is understood that this mUltiple-party form of ownership
arrangement means that the fee simple absolute can or will terminate
before an owner might like it to if the conditions of the loan are not
met. While the financing system does not officially alter the legal
category of being an owner, it does alter the temporal relationship with
the property-the length of time one can expect to enjoy it if one is
unable to repay the loan or otherwise comply with its terms. 97 As a

93.
With the secondary markets and modem securitization, the fragmentation
is, in reality, even greater. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance,
28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2185, 2198-2213 (2007).
94.
As Alexander observes, finance not only facilitated transfers of property,
but also helped transform our concepts of what is property and facilitated a
commodified understanding of land ownership: The fluidity of "[m]arketable interests
in public debt ... helped to create an understanding in popular thought of other forms
of property, including land, as dynamic, and that understanding, in tum, affected the
legal idea of property, pushing it toward the status of commodity." Alexander, supra
note 36, at 316-17 (footnote omitted).
95.
See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
943, 947-52, 959-60 (2009) (explaining the operation of collateralized debt obligations
and credit default swaps).
96.
See generally Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of
2008, 83 AM. BANKR. LJ. 253 (2009) (arguing that collateralized debt obligations and
credit default swaps created hidden debt that caused the financial crisis of 2008); Paul
Krugman, Just Say AAA, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2007, at A19.
97.
For example, breach of a mortgage can take place for a number of reasons
other than failing to make a payment. Breach can also occur for failure to maintain
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result, foreclosure is a legal form of divestment that alters the fee
simple absolute. The ability to enjoy potential appreciation in property
value and the ability to build equity and have access to it for future use
are all considered a part of property ownership, but are in fact dictated
by rules and practices separate from common law property doctrine.
We currently draw artificial distinctions among banking law,98
commercial law, 99 and consumer protection laws loo as unrelated to the
incidents of property ownership and transfer. These systems of law,
which either directly or indirectly mediate property transactions, are as
much a part of property as the Rule Against Perpetuities. 101
The disaggregation of ownership of the right to the loan in the
current crisis has had negative effects.102 No one in the chain of
ownership permitted by the deregulated system of mortgage finance had
any incentive to ensure the loan performed while the secondary system
of securitization acted as if it were unquestionable that the loan
would.103 Another negative effect has been that what could have been

homeowner's insurance or to pay real estate taxes. See generally Michael Giusto,

Mortgage Foreclosure for Secondary Breaches: A Practitioner's Guide to Defining
"Security Impairmenf', 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2563 (2005) (arguing that courts are
inclined to recognize secondary breaches as a basis for foreclosure when the lender
demonstrates good faith).
98.
See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006);
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2006); see also FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxvii (2011),
a vailable
at
http://fcic-static . law .stanford. edu/cdn media/fcic-reportsl
fcicJmalJeport_full.pdf (concluding that the Community Reinvestment Act was not a
significant factor in the subprime lending crisis with only six percent of high cost loans
having any connection to the Act).
99.
See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503,
612 (2002) (arguing that holder in due course doctrine encourages fraud); Siddhartha
Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime
Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 177,203-11 (2003) (criticizing the immunization of assignees of
predatory loans).
100. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011 (a) , 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (federal legislation
creating a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to oversee lending products to
protect against bankruptcy and foreclosure).
101. See Jesse Dukeminier, A Modem Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L.
REv. 1867, 1868-69 (1986) (discussing the Rule's policy justifications and arguing that
the application of the Rule is far more comprehensible than commonly thought).
102. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1047 (2008) (recommending a similar disaggregation of the concept of
homeownership) .
103. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial
Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 549, 568-70 (2009) (demonstrating that
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solid, beneficial gains in access to homeownership were recklessly and
deliberately jeopardized to maximize returns on investment throughout
the chain of finance. 104 As a result, gains in widespread homeownership
across race and class 105 were illusory and are currently being lost
through divestment at shocking rates. 106 The resulting instability
violates basic norms and expectations for ownership by creating
complex, invisible ownership interests in property, apart from the
homeowner, that are neither comprehensible nor adequately informed
about the riskiness of the underlying financing vehicle.107 To understand
how fundamental these norms and expectations are, consider Margaret
Radin's argument in a different yet related context: landlord-tenant law.
In arguing for security of tenure for tenants, Radin used the example of
homeowners as the bellwether standard for basic expectations for
ownership. She argued that "tenants should have the same range of free
choice about whether they stay or go as homeowners. ,,108 This
illustrates an unquestioned assumption that homeownership is about
permanency, if desired. Because of a recurring failure to acknowledge
the implications of instability through alienation and fragmentation, this
assumption is unfulfilled and the promise is broken. The resulting de
facto defeasible fee that most people own means an unacknowledged

securitization (i.e., the commoditization of debt financing, disincentivized lenders to be
concerned about loan quality».
104. See id. at 578-80 (discussing the role of ratings agencies); id. at 582-92
(discussing the moral hazard incentives from securities derivatives like credit default
swaps).
105. Charles Lewis Nier III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of
Racial Predatory Lending and Its Jmpact upon African American Wealth Accumulation,
11 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 131, 191 (2007-08) ("In 1940, the white
homeownership rate was forty-six percent whereas the African American
homeownership rate was twenty-four percent-a gap of twenty-two percent. By 1960,
the white rate had increased dramatically to sixty-four percent fueled in large measure
by the FHA and VA. In contrast, while the black rate increased to thirty-eight percent,
it failed in increase at the same rate as whites. In fact, the racial homeownership gap
actually increased to twenty-six percent." (footnotes omitted».
106. While there is a policy question about whether extensive homeownership
is the best housing policy economically, the reality is that if you are talking about
inexpensive housing, homeownership can work just fine. Expensive housing is good for
very few. Yet our system of finance facilitates expensive housing and land use rules
work to shut out inexpensive housing. See generally Adams, supra note 4; Chase, supra
note 4.
107. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007,
available at http://www .democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren. pdf.
108. RADIN, supra note 26, at 24.
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uncertainty in property ownership: the interest may terminate too soon
and does not match expectations. 109
That uncertainty is also obscured by the term "owner." That
"owner" could be a misleading concept is due, in part, to the shift in
the underlying theory of the impact of fmancing on one's estate in land
from title theory to lien theory. 110 In other words, the answer to the
question of who is considered an owner when there is a mortgage
changed. Under English law's title theory, a person with a debt could
not be considered an owner. Title theory is quite honest about the loss
of rights and potential for divestment. In a pure title theory state, the
mortgagee gets the right to possession before foreclosure. III The shift
from the English law approach to the equitable lien theory approach has
largely obscured what is actually taking place.
3.

PROHIBITION AGAINST DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATIONS

In addition to using fragmentation and layers of ownership
interests to fulfill the policy of alienation, other doctrines prohibit
actions by grantors that inhibit transfer of ownership. Most noteworthy
is the prohibition against direct restraints on alienation. There are also
presumptions against covenants ll2 and restraints on marriage ll3 as
additional examples of restrictions that grantors wish to impose, but
which the common law determined were systemically problematic for
the obstacles they posed to alienation, which it was feared would
impede property markets.

109. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 24, at 2187 ("The usual roles of property
rules-defining rights and identifying rights-holders-not only counteract ... [fmding
parties, clarifying rights] in deals, but also encourage individual investment, planning,
and effort, because actors have a clearer sense of what they are getting. ").
110. See JAMES PARKER HALL & JAMES DEWITT ANDREWS, AMERICAN LAW &
PROCEDURE, REAL PROPERTY, TITLE OF REAL ESTATE, MORTGAGES, MINING AND
IRRIGATION 232-33 (1910).
111. See DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS
§ 1.04, at 7 (2004). Returning to the pure title theory approach would likely, however,
cause disincentives to finance ownership because it would highlight what you are not
getting with all the headaches and obligations of ownership.
112. See, e.g., Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Or. 1997); Forster v.
Hall, 576 S.E.2d 746, 750 (Va. 2003) (disfavoring restrictions on the free use of land);
see also Foods First, Inc. v. Gables Assocs., 418 S.E.2d 888, 889 (Va. 1992)
(covenants must be construed strictly against the grantor).
113. See Lewis v. Searles, 452 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Mo. 1970) (discussing
the traditional prohibition on restraints on marriage as void against public policy, yet
upholding the restraint against marriage because it had a legitimate purpose of
providing support while single).
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4. PRESUMPTIONS AND PROTECTIONS-RECORDING ACTS

Our system of land records to keep track of title and our recording
acts, which seek to encourage owners to utilize the land records system,
are important parts of promoting alienation." 4 It is generally assumed
that the problems presented by our woefully old-fashioned land records
systems 115 have been smoothed out somewhat by the industry of title
insurance, but that is not quite the case. 116 A number of recent news
stories have shown that some property owners have been subject to a
crime sometimes referred to as "deed theft," whereby they either are
tricked into signing a document transferring their property or a deed to
their property has been forged and used to fraudulently transfer
ownership.ll7 This theft by deed is a truly astounding fact, particularly
114. Recording acts in Pennsylvania date back to 1715. CHRISTOPHER FALLON,
THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 329 (1902). One of the earliest
recording acts is from the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Linda Little Carloni, Comment,

The Use of Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret Real Property Conveyances: A Suggested
Limitation, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 897, 916 (1977). Recording acts are in derogation of the
the traditional common law first-in-time-rule. 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY § 82.02[3][b] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009). The more common
view, however, is that these statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed.
ALLEN AxELROD, CURTIS BERGER & QUINTIN JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 534 (2d ed. 1978) (suggesting that recording acts
were suited to a rural sparsely populated country and contribute to expense and
complexity). This raises the question of who bears the burden of that complexity and
who benefits.
115. See Rose, supra note 80, at 586 (describing the recording system as "a
saga of frustrated efforts to make clear who has what in land transfers").
116. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law,
61 VAND. L. REv. 1597, 1629 (2008) (arguing that title insurance is an example of the
"numerous technological and policy changes in the past half century that have lowered
information costs relating to property transactions").
117. E.g., Nathan Gorenstein, Notification System Aims to Combat Fake
Deeds, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 25,2004, at B03; Matt O'Connor, 2 Indicted in Scheme
to Gain Home Titles; 18 Residences Targeted in City, South Suburbs, CHI. TRill., June
23, 1999, at 3; William Sherman, Brownstone is 'Stolen' with Fake Deed, DA Sez,
DAILY NEWS (New York), Apr. 7, 2009, at 45; William Sherman, It Took 90 Mins. to
'Steal' Empire State Building, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 2, 2008, at 6
[hereinafter Empire State Buildinlfj Ironically, the term "property crime" is most
commonly associated with theft or vandalism to home or chattel property, like a car.
But the acts that involve tricks and property suggest that the term property crime is also
appropriately associated with theft of title. The tricks include Familial Trick,
Acquaintance Trick, Rescue Desperation Trick, and Blackmail Trick-buying property
low and sitting on investment property in hopes the market will go up. The trickery can
extend to fmancing fraud. Banks are also tricked into financing properties with overinflated appraisals or fake sales transactions. The term "trick" really means stealing
property by getting the person to cooperate against his or her intention. See Cedar
Rapids Nat'l Bank v. Am. Sur. Co. of NY., 195 N.W. 253, 255 (Iowa 1923) ("If the
false pretenses induce the owner to part with his property, intending to transfer
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considering that it can take significant time and money for ousted
homeowners to get their homes back.1l8 If, however, they were tricked
and the transfer was to a bona fide purchaser, then under accepted
principles they can lose their home permanently, with their only
recourse being damages from the perpetrator-not always a likely
result.
The basic consequences of recording acts are as follows: "[t]he
recording system serves two basic purposes": (l) "it protects existing
owners from losing their property to later purchasers" by providing
constructive notice; and (2) it protects new buyers by allowing them to
qualify for bona fide purchaser protection after careful title searching
reveals no prior interests. 119
In the first-year Property course, law professors have the
unenviable task of introducing students to a difficult concept to grasp:
the grantor 0 has the power to convey property to a first person, let's
say A, and then for whatever reason-fraud, deceit, caprice, or goodfaith mistake-has the ability to re-convey the property to a second
person, B. In other words, 0 has the power to convey property twice.
Not only does 0 have the ability to engage in scurrilous behavior, but
also a stranger has the ability to cheat 0 out of his property-by fraud,
deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation-and sell it to a third person, and
o will not be able to recover his property.120 Part of the outcome can
depend on whether the transferee qualifies as a bona fide purchaser and
whether the transfer-by-trick was procured by forgery or fraud. 121 Thus

both title and possession, the crime is cheating by false pretenses. If, on the other hand,
one by fraud, trick, or false pretense induces the owner to part merely with the
possession of his property, there being no intent to pass the title, and the party who
receives it took it with intent fraudulently to convert it to his own use, the crime is
larceny. ").

118.

See, e.g., Elderly Victim Recovers Home Pilfered by Phony Bishop,

DOWNEY PATRIOT (June 16, 2011), http://thedowneypatriot.comlview/full storyl
143517541article-Elderly-victim-recovers-home-pilfered-by-phony-bishop
(district
attorney successfully moved to have forged deeds voided three years after elderly
homeowner lost home); Allan Lengel, FBI Probes Va. Company's Workers in House
Swindle: Lawsuits Outline Scheme to Forge Deeds to Steal Vacant Properties, WASH.
POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at Dl (noting it took two-and-a-half years of litigation to recover
property stolen with forged deeds).
119. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 25.02 (2d ed.
2007).
120. See, e.g., Empire State Building, supra note 117.
121. Fraud is defined as "[a] false representation of a matter of fact, whether
by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so
that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed.
1979). "Forgery, in addition to being a fraud or misrepresentation, is the execution of a
document by a person other than the person whose signature is required by another
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a forged deed or instrument is per se void for two interrelated reasons,
one implicit, one explicit: (1) the old-fashioned reasoning that the
forged document cannot pass a property interest because the forger had
nothing to place,122 and (2) the more indirect assumption that a forger
cannot protect him or herself from the forgery and is innocent while the
defrauded person had a hand in her own misfortune. 123 While her
consent may have been fraudulently obtained, she gave consent
nonetheless and could have protected herself by investigating or seeking
legal advice. 124
As recent cases of deed theft indicate, the distinction between
fraud and forgery are often so slim as to be meaningless. Similarly, the
principles and policies that govern the fraud-forgery distinction do not
apply with post-foreclosure bank sales. As between the two, the owner
and the bank, the equities are in favor of the purchaser, which in the
case of foreclosure sales is the bank.125 As a consequence, recording
acts reflect an unquestioned principle that contains a market-smoothing
mechanism-in the case of a dispute, recording acts are tailored to
protect buyers and sellers, but not owners. Thus fraud, despite our
protestations to the contrary, is part of property. Ultimately, there has
been a social decision within property doctrine to sometimes ratify
fraud-the basic issue of why 0 can pass property twice. Also, the
fraud-forgery distinction, where a forged deed is void but a fraudulent
deed is voidable, also reflects social decisions in favor of the market
and presumptions of capability that provide less protection for the

person with the intent to deceive." Oscar H. Beasley, Fraud and Forgery, in TITLE
INSURANCE 1990: THE BASICS AND BEYOND 223, 225 (Practising Law Inst. 1990).
122. See, e.g., Martin v. Carter, 400 A.2d 326 (D.C. 1979) (co-owner may
not pass title via deed forging signature of co-owner); Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So.
2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding against a subsequent purchaser without
knowledge, in a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land, because co-owner forged
signature of other co-owner on deed).
123. See, e.g., McCoy v. Love, 382 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1979) (upholding
the effectiveness of a deed procured by fraud reasoning the elderly, illiterate grantor
had "the responsibility of informing herself as to the legal effect of the document she
was signing").
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure:
The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1420-24 (2004)
(describing how the special problems for non-professional bidders at foreclosure
auctions bring less than market prices and disincentives for lenders to correct the
process and observing "the American foreclosure process almost always disadvantages
borrowers and subordinate lienholders").
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defrauded, even though they may literally have been incapable of
protecting their interests. 126
According to Richard Epstein, "the core function of the law is to
protect all persons and their property against the force and fraud of
another. ,,127 While the core function is to protect us from force and
fraud, the law has to accomplish this goal by drawing a line between
acceptable force, fraud, and coercion. The line between these
categories of unacceptable behavior is drawn in a way that fails to
acknowledge that force and fraud will be concentrated towards one end
of the spectrum, or to say it another way, concentrated racially, by
class and geography. The outcome of abuse of recording-system flaws
is that a predator may succeed in seeking to capture value, yet we place
the burden to avoid the predator on the person seeking homeownership.
Particularly, this raises a fundamental question of how much of the
ability or need to trust do we undervalue in property law?128
Recording acts reflect an unquestioned principle that a marketbased property system must contain a market-smoothing mechanism. In
the case of a dispute, recording acts are ultimately tailored to protect
buyers and sellers but not owners. As a consequence, recording acts
facilitate the property markets, but also can and do undercut property
ownership. Recording acts promote commerce, but sometimes at the
expense of the individual. In times of extreme real estate markets or
when there is equity value in homes, predators find it attractively
profitable to try to take people's homes or strip the equity out of
them. 129 The prohibitions against fraud are moral in nature l30 and do not
126. Timothy Arnold Barnes, The Plain Meaning of the Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy: The Void/Voidable Distinction Revisited, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 306-07
(1996)." Void in the strict sense means that an instrument or transaction is nugatory
and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it; voidable exists when an imperfection or
defect can be cured by the act or confirmation of him who could take advantage of it. "
Id. at 306 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1573 (6th ed. 1990)). "In the case of a
voidable act, such an act is no less in violation of legal principles than those acts which
are simply void. The difference is that in the case of a voidable act, courts generally let
sleeping dogs lie; that is, they leave the contract alone unless a party objects." Id. at
307 (footnote omitted).
127. Epstein, supra note 71, at 970.
128. See Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance,
Predatory Conduct, and the Financial Crisis, 66 N.Y.V. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641,669,
684-86 (2011) (arguing that the subprime crisis's underlying failure of regulation is due
to the social distance caused by the extreme level of income inequality).
129. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to
Anyone, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at Al
(describing how Washington Mutual's lending practices during the real estate boom led
to its collapse).
130. Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral
Concepts Inform the Law of PeIjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS LJ.
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fit well with today's instrumental rationale for property. If there is to be
a place for morality, it will require reining in the transactional nature of
property.
II. THE DARK SIDE OF STABILITY: INSTABILITY

A. Mapping Race, Class, and Land Loss
In 2009, the Queens Museum featured an exhibit created by
artist Damon Rich depicting the scale and geographical distribution of
mortgage foreclosures in New York City. 131 A scaled wooden replica of
the city, originally constructed for the 1969 World's Fair, was marked
with tiny red flags to indicate the location throughout the city of homes
whose owners were facing foreclosure. 132 Countless red flags, like tiny
bleeding wounds to the physical landscape, were spread throughout the
city, with noticeable clusters in certain distinct places. 133 The most
striking cluster of flags- "the ground zero of foreclosures" -was
located in the Jamaica neighborhood in the borough of Queens. 134 In a
city of renters, this neighborhood had once been an area of
comparatively high homeownership that was also largely minority. 135
Investigative news reporters pulled the files on each foreclosure
filing on homes in the neighborhood and conducted exhaustive miniinvestigations of the stories behind the documents and statistics. 136 They

157, 160 (2001) ("At early common law, the only kind of fraud that was criminalized
was the narrowly defmed offense of false weights and measures-against which
ordinary prudence was considered insufficient to defend. All other business transactions
were subject to a broad rule of caveat emptor. As commercial relations became
increasingly complex ... the paradigm of 'lying' began to be replaced by the paradigm
of 'misleading.' Today, the definition of what constitutes deception in offenses like mail
fraud, securities fraud, and the Model Penal Code's theft by deception exhibits a much
more flexible formal structure and moral content than ever could have been anticipated
at common law. ").
131.
Red Lines Housing Crisis Leaming Center, QUEENS MUSEUM ART,
http://www .queensmuseum. orglred-lines-housing -crisis-learning-center-2 (last visited
May 19, 2011). For photographs of the exhibit, see id.
132.
Patricia Cohen, Mapping a Bird's-Eye View of Foreclosure Misery,
N. Y. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at Cl. The exhibit was part of an educational and illustrative
installation of how real estate fmance has evolved and contributed to the current
foreclosure crisis. /d
133. /d
134. /d.; see Erik Engquist, Jamaica Area /s Ground Zero of Foreclosure
Crisis, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Dec. 23, 2007, at 26.
135. Engquist, supra note 134.
136. See, e.g., Jess Wisloski et ai., The Tragic Toll of Housing Nightmare,
DAILY NEWS (New York), June 28, 2008, at 8 (detailing results of investigation of
ninety-eight foreclosures in four-block area in Jamaica, Queens, from Linden
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tracked down the former owners and/or residents of properties in the
community and painstakingly constructed a vivid picture of each of the
owners' untold stories. 137 At that time, within a three- to four-block
radius, the reporters found ninety-eight foreclosed properties, and
among those properties they found a variety of tales of woe. 138 Many of
the stories were of exploitation, high-pressure tactics, and ruinous
terms. Every foreclosure involved a subprime loan with predatory
terms that was obtained by predatory tactics. 139 A variety of
exploitative, high-pressure sales tactics, and sometimes outright fraud
or even forgery, were employed-all aimed at making money through
owners taking on loans and paying high fees that they could not really
afford. 14O In some, but not a few, extreme cases, the fraudsters had
either directly stolen houses by forging deeds or stolen mortgage
proceeds (and defrauded banks) by using forged or fraudulent
documentation with straw purchasers to falsely obtain mortgage
loans. 141 Often these crimes were carried out against the elderly,
sometimes by family members. 142 Predators posing as contractors would
offer to do repairs and present an associated realtor or mortgage broker
to agree to ruinous financi~l debt for phony repairs. 143

Boulevard to the north; Foch Boulevard to the south; and 145th, 146th, 147th, and
Inwood streets; west to east}. The Daily News usually provides the news of the moment
rather than in-depth investigative reporting. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the
foreclosures was such that the newspaper was prompted to investigate.

137.
138.
139.

See, e.g., id.
Id.
Id.; see MORRIS, supra note 12.
140. Wisloski et aI., supra note 136; see MORRIS, supra note 12, at 3.
141. Wisloski et aI., supra note 136; see Laura Tierney, Truth Is Stranger Than
Fiction: Tales fTom the Title Trenches, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2006:
WHAT BORROWERS AND LENDERS NEED TO KNow Now 75,84-91 (Practising Law Inst.
2oo6); Kipp Manwaring, On the Front Lines of Real Property Fraud, ADVOCATE, Feb.
2005, at 13.
142. See Wisloski et aI., supra note 136. The investigation revealed concerted
attempts to defraud the low income and the elderly. Id.; see also Robert Gearty & Greg
B. Smith, Vultures Still Feast: Scammers Target Homeowners Frantic to Stay &
Wipe'em Out, DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 29, 2009, at 22 (a year later, reporters
found twenty seven more foreclosures in the four-block area); cf. Phil Fairbanks,

Mortgage Task Force to Probe Foreclosures, Fraud; Significant Problem with
Subprime Loans Found in Certain Low-Income Neighborhoods, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar.
1,2010, at Al (noting formation of "a Mortgage Fraud Task Force to uncover civil and
criminal wrongdoing among brokers, lenders, and buyers" based on the belief that (I)
the foreclosure problem in Buffalo is worse than expected, and (2) the problem is not
fully understood because it is concentrated in poor, minority neighborhoods).
143. See Robert L. Rose, Unwary Homeowners Falling Prey to ImprovementFinance Schemes, WALL ST. J., July 28,1986, at 17.
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Thus, the current general foreclosure crisis began with a subprime
loan crisis that had an inexplicably racialized pattern. Blacks and
Latinos were demonstrably overrepresented in the ranks of subprime
borrowers, receiving some of the worst loans ever originated with
patently unsustainable balloon payments. l44 This happened in a
frenzied, hubristic, deregulated, and fragmented mortgage-loan system
that minimized accountability and sought only bodies to sign loan
documents. 145 How those bodies became overwhelmingly black and
brown ones is a testament to the dynamic of race in the paradigm of
stable property ownership. The Black experience has been a story of a
quest for all of the promise and expectation of property ownership as a
method of wealth creation, but more so as a repudiation against and
protection from SUbjugation. There are countless untold stories of
Blacks acquiring property, successfully holding it, and passing wealth
down to succeeding generations. l46 But the whispers of stories about
sundown towns and Rosewood147 and Tulsal48 -situations where Blacks
obtained full ownership of property and yet had physical violence used
against them by jealous White neighbors to literally dispossess them
and run them out of town-are well-known. 149 However, these
experiences have not been incorporated into the lexicon of the story of
property ownership and what it means in the United States.

B. History ofPersistent InstabiJity for Some BJack Property Owners
With the advent of the policy of free transfer, the reliance on
arms-length transactions as the basis of property relationships, and the

SeeKastely, supra note 7.
145. See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Fraud Seen as a Driver in Wave of
Forec1osures-Adanta Ring Scams Bear Steams, Getting $6. 8 Million in Loans, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 21, 2007, at Al (describing how lenders reduced barriers to credit by, for
144.

example, offering "stated-income" loans, or "liar's loans," which required no proof of
income).
146. See generally LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE
SOUTH: 1790-1915 (1990).
147. See MANNING MARABLE, THE GREAT WELLS OF DEMOCRACY: THE
MEANING OF RACE IN AMERICAN LIFE 238-40 (2002) (describing 1923 massacre by
Whites of approximately 200 Black residents, followed by Black residents' properties
being illegally seized).
148. [d. at 240-41 (describing 1921 riot in which 10,000 Whites looted and
burned Tulsa's "Black Wall Street" killing approximately 300 people and destroying
more than 1200 homes with tacit approval of state and local officials).
149. See SCHWENINGER, supra note 146, at 79-80; Todd Lewan et al., Tom

from the Land' Landownership Made Blacks Targets of Violence and Murder, an AP
Investigation Shows (pt.
2),
AUTHENTIC
VOICE
(Dec.
3,
2001),
http://www.theauthenticvoice.org/PDFs/TornFromTheLandPart2.pdf.

2011:855

Properties of Instability

889

incorporation of fluid real estate markets as a policy goal into property
doctrine, the stability paradigm currently gives short shrift to certain
realities: a dark side of property markets and its impact on ownership.
The dark side of property ownership is that some may involuntarily lose
their property for failure to pay the carrying costs of the property, such
as loan payments and property taxes. This is largely uncontroversial
and accepted as a consequence of the bargain the purchaser made when
obtaining the property. With an ongoing foreclosure crisis taking place
at present, that painful, disruptive, and destructive reality is all too
apparent. ISO But the reality of involuntary loss of land has also
incorporated the dynamic of race and predation in a way that should no
longer be confined to the shadows of property doctrine, but rather
should be brought out in the open and considered for what it means
about the true nature of stability and instability that different people
experience based, not on what they have, but on who they are.
C. The History of Foreclosure Crises: Overrepresentation of Minorities
The racial dynamic in the stability paradigm has been consistent
over time, yet overlooked. Operating in tandem with a predatory
corollary, the racial dynamic has had devastating results. As the
following sections will demonstrate, the migration of Southern Blacks
to the North in search of economic opportunity brought new predatory
opportunities arising from racial residential segregation and exclusion
from mortgage financing. 151 In the 1950s, installment land-sales
contracts were used to exploit Blacks who were shut out of receiving
mortgage financing because of their race.152 In the 1960s, in the
aftermath of the passage of the Fair Housing Act,153 there was a miniforeclosure crisis as the first serious attempts to make opportunities for
homeownership available to Black Americans led to a predatory episode

150. Our agreement that foreclosure is okay goes away when there is a massive
event of widespread foreclosure problems. Then the rules are adjusted through
legislative efforts to protect homesteads. See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi DyalChand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1607, 1629-30, 1633-34 (2010)
(detailing early and current federal response to the mortgage crisis and attempts to
encourage voluntary renegotiation of mortgage loans). See generally Joseph William
Singer, Property Law and the Mortgage Crisis: Libertarian Fantasies and Subprime
Realities, 1 PROP. L. REV. 7, 12 (2011) (discussing estates and alienability).
151. See discussion infra Part II.D.
152. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.b.
153. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 3601-19 (2006)).
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that resulted in divestment. 154 In cities like Buffalo, Memphis, and
Chicago, there was a problem in the depressed housing markets that
supported fraudulent or exploitative flipping schemes in the 1990s.155
Maryland's unique system of ground-lease homeownership was
exploited in the 2000s to divest people of their homes through simple
landlord-tenant eviction procedures to reclaim the land and the
improvements installed upon it. 156 During the hot real estate markets of
the 2000s, in rural areas, heir property was subject to predatory abuse
of co-owned, family property. 157 Today in the aftermath of the crisis we
see the trauma and devastation of experiencing foreclosure worsened by
foreclosure rescue fraud. 158 And, possibly worst of all, we have seen a
particularly inventive form of acquisition, best described as predatory
buying, where the predators are the buyers who operate as part of a
network of "investors" to trap unwary homeowners into real estate
contracts with executory periods that give buyers sole control over
getting to closing.159

D. Instability Stories
1.

CAPTIVE MARKETS

a. Sharecropping and land peonage
The most well-known historical episode of exploitative behavior in
land relationships for Blacks post-slavery extends back to the
sharecropping era. During this era, Blacks, newly freed from slavery,
and their descendants were required to tum to sharecropping, where
they lived in a transactional web of post-slavery predatory behavior. 160

154. See ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LoT: How REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN Us 1-3
(2009). See generally BRIAN D. BOYER, CITIES DESTROYED FOR CASH: THE FHA
SCANDAL AT HUD (1973).
155. See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
157. See discussion infra Part II.D.4.b.
158. Foreclosure rescue fraud was an even worse form of predatory
exploitation, the goal of which was equity stripping. The predators peruse the public
records to be able to carefully time the hunt and kill off their prey with unerring
precision and heartlessness; the scheme is carefully timed to mislead and manipulate
fear and lack of knowledge. See Seth Yaffo, Beware the Dotted Line: Foreclosure
Rescue Fraud in Mary/and and the Growing Effort to Combat It, 37 U. BALT. L. REv.
113,114-17 (2007).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
160. It should be noted that a not insignificant number of Black people were
able to somehow save money and obtain land. Anna Stolley Persky, In the Cross-Heirs,
A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 44, 46 ("According to the Land Loss Prevention Project
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They labored uncompensated for a share of the crop; they purchased
equipment and seed from merchants who charged higher prices for
items bought on credit and got crop liens (exorbitant liens on future
crops) and property liens on other personal property .161 Today Black
farmers have continued to experience discrimination in acquiring crop
fmancing from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 162 This has
contributed to dramatic losses in Black rural landownership,163 which
has been worsened by exploitative and predatory land transaction
behavior by developers, leading to the loss of heir property by
manipulation of co-ownership rules to precipitate partition sales. 164

b. Installment land-sales contracts
Another legacy of the captive market for land ownership
experienced by Blacks was the popularity of the use of installment land
contracts, or rent-to-own property-transfer arrangements. During the
post-World War II era, not only were Blacks locked out of mortgage
financing and thus homeownership,165 but also they were locked into a
... of the 15 million acres of land acquired by African-Americans after Emancipation,
about two million remain owned by their descendants. "); see also Lewan et ai., supra
note 149.
161. Nier, supra note 105, at 156-57 ("Indeed, it was possible that a crop
could be subject to four separate liens, including: a landlord's lien for rent; a landlord's
lien for an advance; a merchant's lien for an advance; and a laborers' lien for wages. ").
162. See Cassandra Jones Havard, African-American Fanners and Fair
Lending: RaciaJizing Rural Economic Space, 12 STAN. L & POL'y REv. 333, 333
(2001).
163. Charles Nier offers a compelling account of the level of effort, sacrifice,
and subterfuge it took for sharecroppers to assemble cash away from the hostile gaze of
Whites intent on keeping them in impoverished servitude. Nier, supra note 105, at 162.
In Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana, Daniel and Rose Trotter, with the
assistance of numerous relatives, labored for fifteen years as renters on five
different plantations in an effort to save $700 for a down payment to
purchase some land. In addition to farming, both Daniel and Rose Trotter
performed other odd jobs in an effort to save money for a down payment,
including: selling eggs, raising and selling pigs, sewing dresses and jeans,
'fixing miller machinery,' 'fixing water clock,' and fixing guns. The
Trotter's many years of toil was rewarded in 1900 when they were finally
able to purchase thirty-five acres of land.
Id. at 163-64 (footnotes omitted). According to Nier, "throughout the South, by 1910,
African American land ownership in rural areas was twenty-one percent." Id. at 16768.
164. See Mitchell, supra note 18, at 511; see also John G. Casagrande Jr.,
Note, Acquiring Property through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27
B.C. L. REv., 755 (1986) (recommending use of existing common law alternatives like
owelty and allotment as an alternative to partition sales).
165. Nier, supra note 105, at 185 ("[D]uring the time period from 1930 to
1960, scholars have demonstrated that 'fewer than one percent of all mortgages in the
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pervasive, institutionalized system of neighborhood racial segregation,
with all but a few neighborhoods literally off-limits to Black
residents. 166 Being locked out of the mortgage-lending market made
Blacks vulnerable to predatory schemes that used fragmented ownership
as a substitute for bank financing and provided a ready vehicle for fraud
and exploitation. 167 For example, the installment land contract system in
cities like Chicago was deliberately used to inflate prices charged and
divest Blacks of their considerable down and installment payments in
order to allow the seller to have the lucrative opportunity to resell or
flip the property to another dupe. 168 The rent-to-own agreements were
styled as ownership on installment: legal title was not vested in the
buyer until the last payment was made, even if years later. Breach of
the contract terms, however slight, including one missed payment,
would be sufficient default for eviction like an ordinary tenant. All
equity, in the form of down payments and installment payments, would
be forfeited to the seller. 169
The installment land sales were predatory in the worst way. 170
Consider Beryl Satter's account of the case of Albert and Sallie Bolton.
They were evicted from their home that they had purchased on
installment. They paid $13,900 for a "cramped, one-hundred-year-old
wood-frame house. ,,171 The sellers had purchased the property the week
before for $4,300.172 The person who sold them the house never
revealed that he was not the agent, as he represented himself to be, but
was in fact the building's owner.173 They signed an installment land sale
contract with the seller's assurances that he would help them obtain a

nation were issued to African Americans."'(quoting DANIEL L. KiRP ET AL., OUR
TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 7 (1995»).
166. DAVID M. P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE
RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA 4-9 (2007).
167. See BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES, RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE
EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 3-6 (2009).
168. Id
169. Calvin Bradford, Financing Home Ownership: The Federal Role in
Neighborhood Decline, 14 URB. AFF. Q. 313, 319 (1979).
170. See Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill.
1969), aff'd on other grounds, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S.
821 (1970); see also Note, Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial Unconscionability,
and Section 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case, 80 YALE L.J. 516, 540-42, 558
n.143 (1971) (arguing that this behavior should be considered racial unconscionability).
For an earlier fictional account of the installment land-sales contract scheme used
against recent Eastern European immigrants, see UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Harper
& Bros. Publishers 1951) (1905).
171. SATTER, supra note 167, at 3.
172. Id
173. Id. at 4.
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mortgage, which at the time was nearly impossible to do. After a
substantial down payment, they defaulted and were evicted. 174 As the
attorney for the Boltons summed up for a news story at the time:
"Contract sellers do not in fact sell the home to a Negro, ... [t]hey use
the home as bait to defraud the Negro out of a substantial sum of
money and then push the Negro out into the street [in order to] defraud
another party. " 175
In Baltimore, a similar exploitative fInancing arrangement was
carried out through similar abusive practices, yet using a variant of the
fragmented land-ownership arrangement: the ground lease. 176 It too was
a fmancing vehicle of last resort, attractive to Black homebuyers who
either could not obtain traditional fmancing or needed a reduced
purchase price. 177 The seller retained the ownership of the underlying
ground while the homeowner retained ownership of the
improvements. 178 Constrained to live in "the ghetto" and without other

174. Id at 39. According to Satter, bringing the forcible entry and detainer
action was swift and cost $4.50; bringing a foreclosure action would have cost $100 to
$300. Id. at 57.
175. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Sheltons, another family
who acquired a house in as egregious an arrangement as the Boltons, successfully made
their payments without fail for six years. Id. at 65. Because the buyer's default was part
of the scheme, the seller went to extraordinary means to push them into default. Id. The
seller changed their locks to their home because of some fictional problem he created
about money owed to the federal government, a problem which he promised to fix in
return for them signing a contract. Id The contract turned out to be a quitclaim deed.
Id. They ultimately lost the home, which was worth $3,500 even though they had been
charged $9,950 and paid $8,743 in installments and made $2,300 in improvements. Id.
176. See MARY ELLEN HAYWARD & CHARLES BELFOURE, THE BALTIMORE
ROWHOUSE 12-15 (1999) (discussing origins of ground rent in Baltimore); Garrett
Power, Entail in Two Cities: A Comparative Study of Long Term Leases in
Birmingham, Eng/and and Baltimore, Mary/and 1700-1900, 9 J. ARCHITECTURAL &
PLAN. REs. 315, 320-22 (1992) ("In Baltimore the ground rent system proved
instrumental in lining the alleys with small dwelling houses held by industrious workers
on long-term subleaseholds. The reduction in size and the pay-as-you-go fmancing
made them affordable, and since the subleases were renewable forever, they were the
next best thing to fee simple ownership .... Baltimore's ground rents ... are [now] an
endangered species. Twentieth century forces push them toward extinction. H); cf.
Kenneth N. Gilpin, Victor Posner, 83, Master of Hostile Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2002, at A29 Wall Street corporate raider Victor Posner dropped out of school at
the age of 13 and began working for his father's grocery store. Id. Using the money
that he earned, Posner built run-down, low-cost housing and sold it at less than market
value to Blacks, while retaining ownership of the land beneath the homes. Id
177. See Power, supra note 167, at 318.
178. See HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 176, at 12-13; see also Power,
supra note 176, at 320 ("The biggest difference between Baltimore and Birmingham,
however, was the role of ground rents in the investment market. The genius of the
Baltimore ground rents was that once created they became highly negotiable. They
required little active management and in the event of nonpayment they were a first lien
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access to financing because redlining had made mortgage loans nearly
impossible to obtain in cities, many Blacks acquired homes through the
ground-lease method. 179 As late as the mid-2000s, these ground leases
were the vehicle for additional predatory behavior. "Investors" would
purchase the reversionary interests and the attendant right to collect
rents under the lease and then engage in deceptive behavior to prevent
the homeowners from being actually able to pay the lease payments. 180
Often, the notices were sent to collect rent on long-dormant ground
leases to people who did not understand that they had a ground lease
and ignored the notices. In two reported instances, homeowners were
evicted from the property for failure to pay rent because they were in
arrears for as little as $500. 181 Under the eviction process, ground-lease
landlords gained repossession of the ground and any improvements
erected thereon. Though the resulting forfeiture was immense, judges
felt they had no choice but to treat the arrangement as a simple bargain
gone bad. 182

and well-secured. "); Harold Seneker, Why Victor Posner Is Riding High, FORBES, Oct.
29, 1979, at 36 ("Another thing that makes prospective corporate victims
is
Posner's
now-legendary
beginning:
selling
houses
uncomfortable
to blacks in Baltimore's ghettos in the early 1950s, but not selling the land under the
houses (the ground rents did much to make him a multimillionaire in Miami Beach
instead of a struggling real estate broker in Baltimore). "). The ground rent is a
holdover from British colonial rule and is limited mainly to Maryland and parts of
Pennsylvania. HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 176, at 12-13. Ground rent allowed
the owner to speculate without spending any money, because the house could be built
and sold before the first ground rent was due. Id. at 22. The ground rents were
negotiable and became the builders major profit source and a supply of capital for other
projects. Id. at 165. Financing was unavailable to Blacks at the tum of the century. Id.
at 126, 155. Segregation restricted Blacks, who made up one-fifth of the population, to
live on one-fiftieth of the land. Id. at 171.
179. See ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN My NEIGHBORHOOD: How BIGOTRY SHAPED
A GREAT AMERICAN CITY 103, 168-70 (2010) (noting the use of installment land-sale
contracts as well as ground leases).
180. See Fred Schulte & June Arney, The New Lords of the Land: A Small
Number of Investors JWJo Own Many Baltimore Ground Rents Often Sue Delinquent
Payers, Obtaining Their Houses or Substantial Fees, BALT. SUN, Dec. 11,2006, at lA.
181. Fred Schulte & June Arney, On Shaky Ground: An Archaic Law Is Being
Used to Tum Baltimoreans out of Their Homes, BALT. SUN, Dec. 10,2006, at 1A.
182. See id. One judge told a homeowner at an ejectment proceeding: "You're
in a tough spot because they're acting in accordance with the law, and the law does
allow them to impose fees ... How much of the $1,837 can you pay?" Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The homeowner wrote the leaseholder a check for $1,500
after the hearing and kept her home. Id.
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EMERGING MARKETS (SECTION 235: 1968's PROGRAM OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR THE POOR)

The pervasiveness and variety of predatory land dispossession
stories seem to indicate that they were largely a consequence of
discriminatory treatment and the exclusion of Blacks from the system of
property ownership that denied them access to fmancing. 183 Yet efforts
to include have also been fraught with instability. Following the
adoption of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, there was a foreclosure crisis
when Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance was fmally
made available to Blacks. l84 In the early 1970s, the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 (HUDA) established programs to spur lowincome housing construction, such as Section 235, which made interest
subsidies available to enable low- and moderate-income families to
purchase houses. 18S Problems with the HUDA included "[c]umbersome
regulations and rigid property standards that could not be met by innercity properties [and which] steered the program to the suburbs. ,,186 The
Section 235 program was later found to have been used by the FHA "to
perpetuate racially segregated residential patterns in metropolitan
areas. ,,187 Property flipping was a prevalent abuse in the program.
Redlining by private lenders was also a prevalent abuse. 188
Even when there were no deliberate abuses, underwriting
standards in many instances were lax. Borrowers were
underwritten to carry debt service and housing costs that

183. As Joseph Singer observes, the implicit stick in the bundle, the right to
acquire property, was secured by the Fair Housing Act. See Joseph William Singer,
Rent, 39 B.C. L. REv. 1, 34 (1997) ("[P]ublic accommodations laws and fair housing
laws substantially limit the owner's right to exclude nonowners on the ground of race or
other protected categories, such as sex or religion .... They do so to ensure that each
person has the right to acquire property without regard to race. "); see also Joseph W.
Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted' Minimum Standards for the
Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL'y REv. 139,
145, 147 (2008) (making a similar argument in the context of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 about the right to acquire goods).
184. See KATZ, supra note 154, at 9-10.
185. Sylvia C. Martinez, The Housing Act of 1949: Its Place in the Realization
of the American Dream of Homeownership, 11 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 467, 472
(2000) ("Yet for all its failings, the 235 program provided the one and only possibility
for many families to become first-time home buyers. Between 1970 and 1973, it
financed some 142,000 to 193,000 homeownership units a year. By 1973, it had
insurance in force for more than 588,000 units. ").
186. Id. at 472 n.6.
187. Id. at 472.
188. Id. at 472 n.4.
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would not support family emergencies or repair costs .... The
stories of low-income families losing hard-earned savings
after their homes were foreclosed were legion. 189

The structure of the Section 235 program led to an all-too-familiar
predatory scenario. When Section 235 loans were made, participants
were required:
to pay a fixed percentage of their incomes for a home
purchase regardless of the selling price of the
house .... Thus, buyers had no real incentive to negotiate for
lower prices or better terms, and honest appraisers had
incentives to report the highest value that could be justified.
Dishonest appraisers had strong incentives to collude with
sellers .... 190
Hearings held in 1972 before the Senate Judiciary Committee
documented "egregious examples of racial discrimination" and
"flagrant abuses" involving the program. 191 There were a number of
horror stories involving bank-initiated redlining,192 collusion between
FHA staff and lenders to falsify purchaser and appraisal information,
and property flipping. 193
Today, predatory practices with respect to low- to moderateincome homeownership by Blacks in racially segregated neighborhoods
continue. A recent, particularly troubling example of predatory
behavior has been a phenomenon coined as "predatory purchasing." 194
This involves an investor-buyer-usually part of an organized group of
people who style themselves as real estate investors-who creates a
scheme and set of contractual documents to fmd "undervalued"

189. [d. at 472.
190. John M. Quigley, A Decent Home: Hausjng PaJjcy jn Perspectjve, jn
BROOKINGS-WARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 53, 61-62 (William G. Gale & Janet
Rothenberg Pack eds., 2000).
191. Martinez, supra note 185, at 471-72.
192. [d. at 472 n.4 ("In Boston ... a coalition of lenders, the Boston Banks
Urban Renewal Group, established a loan pool for low- and moderate-income
purchasers and delineated where the funds could be spent, thereby limiting the area
where African-American families could live (a practice known as 'redlining'). ").
193. [d. ("In some cities, FHA staff shared office space with lenders. Loan,
appraisal, and income information was falsified. Property flipping was also cited as an
abuse. In Boston, a home purchased from a white family for $14,000 was sold to an
African-American family on the same day for $22,000. ").
194. Brian Parkinson, Caveat Venditor: Predatory Purchasing in the Post-Boom
Residential Real Estate Market 41, 41-43 (2009) (unpublished note) (manuscript on file
with author).
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property and acquire it for less than it is worth in the hopes of selling it
for more than it is worth later. 195 The investor-buyers use deceptive and
exploitative contractual terms to extend the executory period to
psychologically or fmancially exploit the seller's desire to close on the
sale. 196 Once the predatory "buyer" has gotten the seller to the point of
desperation, he or she is able to obtain the property at a price the
investor considers quite lucrative. The property is then flipped to other
investors who then sell the property for a much higher price, thus
reaping a windfall. 197 Thus, this exploitative real estate purchase
contract locks unsuspecting property owners into destructively
exploitative agreements and allows the "investor" buyer to use
extended delay to force the seller to accept as little as possible for his or
her home. 198
What is noteworthy is that this example of real estate investment is
not a marginal or fringe endeavor. In order to perpetuate this
arrangement, at least one real estate "school" exists to instruct investors
on how to target low-income homeowners (sellers) to enter these
agreements (which are not recorded in the land records office),199 Guest
lecturers at the school include some of the city's most respected and
prominent attorneys and politicians. 2°O How the exploitative part of this
endeavor escapes them is hard to understand until one considers the
opposite possibility: that exploitation is normal and necessary to
property markets. 201

195. See id. at 42-43.
196. See id. at 52-54.
197. See id. at 55-56.
198. See id. at 54.
199. Id. at 42.
200. Id. at 49.
201. Redevelopment and highway-building are additional examples of the
instability of Black land ownership. Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation

between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and
Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 699, 768 (1993) ("[T]he poor, who tended to be
disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities, suffered in the brave new urban world
built over their former homes. From 1949 to 1961, urban renewal displaced 85,000
families in 200 American cities, while federally funded renewal and highway programs
displaced about 100,000 families and 15,000 businesses per year." (footnote omitted)).
Blacks have been divested of their property and community through eminent domain,
whether excluded or included within what is supposed to be a stable, predictable system
of ownership. This further reveals the tension between the presumption of free
alienation and the policy goal of stability. The question is: how much exploitation is
necessary?
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3.

DOWN MARKETS AND PROPERTY FLIPPING

Down or depressed real estate markets as well as hot real estate
markets seem to present equally attractive opportunities for predatory
behavior. In the late 1990s, when real estate markets were depressed,202
and had been so on and off since at least the 1970s, cities with very
depressed real estate markets, like Baltimore,203 Cleveland,204 Atlanta, 205
Chicago,206 and Buffalo,207 were hotbeds of property-flipping
schemes. 208 Property flipping has in recent years been celebrated in
media by television shows with the same name as a positive
phenomenon. 209 In its ideal form, the property flip provides a public
service to the real estate market-renovating an outdated and sometimes
dilapidated home while allowing the flipper to sell the newly
refurbished house and profit by the increment between acquisition cost
and selling price. But property flipping has a more nefarious
manifestation as well. In the context of central cities with large stocks
of dilapidated, sometimes-vacant, or abandoned housing, property
flipping in its more negative connotation involves acquiring a low-cost
home, possibly, but not necessarily, doing cosmetic repairs, and then
reselling the property quickly, usually within two months or less "at a

202. But see Barldey v. Olympia Mortg. Co., No. 04 CV 875 (RJD)(KAM),
2007 WL 2437810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,2007) (example of a property-flipping scheme
in New York City).
203. John B. O'Donnell, Housing Prices Soar, Sometimes in a Day, BALT.
SUN, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1A (noting that flipping contributes to Baltimore being a "hot
spot for mortgage fraud").
204. Bob Paynter, Quick Resales Heat Housing Market: Investors Reaping Fast
Money Draw Activists' Anger, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 27,2000, at 1A.
205. David Pendered, Low-Cost Housing Efforts Hit Wall: Affordllbility Fades
as Rehabs and Mortgage Scams Raise Property Values, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 19,
2004, at IE.
206. See MINORITY STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., PROPERTY "FLIPPING": HUD's
FAILURE TO CURB MORTGAGE FRAUD 18-19 (Comm. Print 2001).
207. Deidre Williams, City Aims to Make Flipping Flop: New Database
Designed to Help Task Force Speed Crackdown on Scams Hitting Hard in Housing
Market, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 26, 2005, at AI.
208. See The Monitor, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'y REp., Apr. 2010, at
19, 21 ("A fraudulent property flip is a scheme in which individuals, businesses or
straw borrowers buy and sell properties among themselves to artificially inflate the
value of the property. ").
209. E.g.,
Flip
That
House,
TLC,
http://tlc.discovery.coml
fansites/flipthathouse/tlipthathouse.html (last visited May 19, 2011); Flip This House:
About the Show, A&E TV, http://www.aetv.comlflipthishouse/tlip2_aboutshow.jsp
(last visited May 19, 2011).
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substantial and fraudulently inflated mark up. ,,210 The rapid turnaround
"is oftentimes a sound indicator that the resale is being accomplished
through falsely inflated appraisals, sham second mortgages, false
deposits, phony gift letters and loan applications littered with
misleading and deceptive credit and financial information. ,,211
The unwitting purchaser is most often an inexperienced, first-time
homebuyer with limited income.212 During the last property-flipping
craze, inexperienced investors were also often victims. Usually they
were primarily working class and would be "enticed into buying blocks
of houses-three to ten at a time-with the understanding that they
[could] receive cash back at settlement and incur little or no long term
fmancial risk. ,,213
The pervasiveness of these flips victimizes the individually
defrauded purchasers, who are not only fmancially ruined, but also
divested of successfully reaching the goal of stable ownership of
material resources essential to attain that protected status entitling one
to protection from change. The resulting foreclosures also poison the
210. Joseph L. Evans, Property Flipping in Baltimore: A Prosecutorial
Perspective, MD. B.J., Mar.lApr. 2002, at 36, 37 ("[In a five-year period] more than
2,500 Baltimore City properties ... [were] bought and quickly resold for at least double
the original purchase price. ").
211. [d. at 37. According to Evans, property flipping cannot be carried out
without the collusion of real estate professionals. [d. at 38. An appraiser would
typically give a false high appraisal and then the seller would present a mortgage broker
who arranges for financing at the falsely high level, usually on terms the buyer could
not really afford. [d. Later, when the buyer tries to refinance, the true appraisal leaves
them upside down in the house, which usually results in default. [d.
212. [d. at 37; see also id. at 38 ("These appraisals oftentimes falsely represent
the identity of the present owner, the property's sales history, the prevailing prices for
residential property in the neighborhood and the nature and background of other
properties used as comparable sales .... The mortgage brokers [then] submit loan
application packages . . .contain[ing] false information about the purchaser-borrower' s
credit history and fmancial status. [They] can contain false explanations about past
credit problems and can supply seller-second mortgage and down payment information
when the mortgage broker has reason to know that the down payment came from the
seller and the take-back mortgage is not real. [They] can also falsely depict the tenancy
or leasehold status of the property if it is an investment deal. "); Stanley I. Foodman,
Predatory Lending and Mortgage Fraud, 126 BANKING L.J. 254, 264-68 (2009)
("Property flipping is nothing new; however, once again law enforcement is faced with
an educated criminal element that is using identity theft, straw borrowers, and shell
companies, along with industry insiders, to conceal their methods and override lender
controls. "); Elizabeth Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage Market:
Suggested Reforms in A Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEX.
L. REv. 421, 426 (2003).
213. Evans, supra note 210, at 37 ("[Blue-collar investors were] led to believe
that upon assuming ownership of the houses, the rental income [would] cover the debt
service [and] that the value of the house [would] increase over time so that the investor
[could] always sell the house to recoup his investment. ").
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struggling neighborhood. 214 Vacant homes and absent residents are
physically toxic to neighborhood life due to the stagnancy of what one
would consider a functioning and desirable residential experience. It is
also toxic to a functioning and desirable opportunity to access property
ownership through the market. 215 This is further compounded by the
sheer number of flips that were concentrated in the same geographical
area in central cities' neighborhoods, which happened to be the ones
that are segregated Black, making it difficult for subsequent purchasers
to distinguish valid sales from invalid flipS.216 With the flip transaction
made to seem normal, these neighborhoods become a buffer for the
entire metropolitan area's system of property ownership.217 Predatory
activity can take place here protected by the very systems that are
ostensibly designed to discourage this activity. Destructive, abnormal
behavior becomes standard or normal. 218
The key to the success of fraudulent flipping schemes seems to
have been the down market that existed during the 1990s, which
resulted in comparatively inexpensive real estate in then-economically
devalued inner-city (racially segregated) neighborhoods. Yet, the
prevalence of very similar schemes in up markets indicates that the
value of the real estate presents an opportunity for the methods used to
deploy fraud and exploitation. Therefore, whether real estate is cheap

214. See, e.g., Thomas Ott & Michael O'Malley, The Ruin Spreads Far and
Wide, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 24, 2008, at Al (describing effects of
widespread foreclosures in Cleveland and its suburbs).
215. Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & O. Emre Ergungor, Slowing Speculation: A
Proposal to Lessen Undesirable Housing Transactions, FOREFRONT, Winter 2011, at
20,20-22.
216. Evans, supra note 210, at 39.
217. Cf
David
Dante
Troutt,
Ghettoes
Made
Easy:
The
MetamarketiAntimarket Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic
Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 427, 441-42 (2000) ("[R]esidential spatial
arrangements constituted the institutionalization of middle-class ideal structures
... [and] deference to middle class structures, in the face of a variety of legal
challenges, was for decades undisputed, and it legitimated the public and private forces
that constructed separate worlds. "); David D. Troutt, Katrina's Window: Localism,
Resegregation and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1109, 1110-11 (2008)
("[I]n the social identification of space and safety ... a suburban locality's police
powers are routinely used to affirm expectations segregated by both race and class. ").
218. Evans, supra note 210, at 39 ("[O]nce the snowball starts, it becomes an
avalanche so that property databases become polluted with flips thereby making
additional flips appear to be normal transactions. Neighborhoods deteriorate because of
vacancies and foreclosures which make more houses available to be snatched up by
flippers. Unethical business practices become so customary that any, normal moral
compass that an appraiser, settlement agent or mortgage broker may have, becomes
skewed.").
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or expensive, there seems to be an opportunity for predators. 219 The
question that remains is: how does the identity of the defrauded
purchasers and their geographical connection to segregated
communities continually provide an opportunity for fraud and
exploitation, suggesting the problem is greater than any technical fix
can cure? As the following discussion will show, even though we now
supposedly exist in a regime where there is a unified, racially integrated
scheme for property financing and ownership, the reality is that today's
problems are troublingly reminiscent of an era when things were much
worse. We are still on a quest to discover the source of this recurring
story of fraud and exploitation.
4. UP MARKET EXPLOITATION

a. Subprime mortgage loan foreclosures
The land divestment stories recounted thus far indicate that
predatory land loss is neither unique nor limited to a bygone era. The
hot market (i.e., rapidly appreciating property prices) also played a role
in the most recent episode of exploitative behavior. For example, the
loss of "heir" property through partitionini20 has been attributed to hot
markets that make more land than usual capable of producing quick and
high returns. In some ways, the recent subprime loan and foreclosure
crisis is a product of a hot real estate market. Of course, that is only
part of the explanation. We must consider the relevant aspects of what

219. A significant problem seems to be the extent to which certain real estate
law procedures are manipulated. For example, Christia Pritts recommends that if deeds
were required to be recorded within a certain time period and the prior purchase price
were required to be disclosed, subsequent buyers would have protection against flippers
by allowing them to discover how little the seller had paid for the property. Christia A.
Pritts, Forcing Property Flippers to Show Their Hand: The Prior Purchase Price
Disclosure Requirement, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 446,
457-60 (2002).
220.
Todd Lewan & Dolores Barclay, Tom from the Land: Today,
Developers and Lawyers Use a Legal Maneuver to Strip Black Families of Land (pt.
3), AUTHENTIC VOICE (Dec. 9, 2001), http://www.theauthenticvoice.org/
Torn_From_The_LandIII.html ("Moreover, black landowners cannot always count on
their own lawyers. Sometimes, the Commerce Department study found, attorneys
representing blacks filed partition actions that were against their clients' interests. "). As
investigative reporters observed:
Blacks have lost land through partitioning for decades; the AP found several
cases in the 1950s. But in recent years, it has become big business. Legal
fees for bringing partition actions can be high-often 20 percent of the
proceeds from the land sales. Families, in effect, end up paying the fees of
the lawyers who separate them from their land.
[d.
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happened to the homeowners in Queens. In another immediately
preceding era,221 Jamaica, Queens, had been redlined by banks as
ineligible or undesirable for mortgage lending. 222 Part of what seems to
be relevant to the most recent crisis is the unprecedented "housing
bubble." Fueled by easy access to credit throughout the entire globe,
rates of real estate investment soared, and housing prices rose
precipitously throughout the 2000S.223 The subprime crisis also followed
a historic push to increase homeownership for Blacks and Latinos to
correct the legacy of inequality and discrimination that kept their
homeownership levels low. 224 The symbolic meaning of attaining
homeownership as well as the tangible benefits of building equity
convinced and allowed many to become homeowners for the first
time. 225 The popular conception often repeated in popular media is that
the crisis was precipitated because banks were forced to lend to
unqualified minorities. 226
According to Alyssa Katz, the lesson of the subprime crisis is that
minority subprime borrowers were targeted because they represented a

221. This is the era preceding the Fair Housing Act, the Community
Reinvestment Act, the Horne Mortgage Disclosure Act, and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.
222.
See Joseph P. Fried, Bank Redlining Still Prevalent, Loan Critics Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1989, at 36; N.Y.C. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS
NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION PROGRAM, REDLINING IN SOUTHEAST QUEENS: A STUDY
OF THE MORTGAGE LENDING PRACTICES OF THE DIME SAVINGS BANK OF NEW YORK IN
THE COMMUNITIES OF LAURELTON, CAMBRIA HEIGHTS, ROSEDALE AND BROOKVILLE

(1977),

available

at

http://www.nyc.gov/htrnl/cchr/pdf/

redlining_in_ southeast_queens. pdf.
223.
See Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REv.
1213, 1255-60 (2010).
224. See KATZ, supra note 154, at 3-26 (describing the campaign to increase
homeownership that spanned a number of presidential administrations). The story of
this push is contested and the dispute is related to the larger yet-to-be-answered
question of what caused the mortgage financial crisis in general. See Charles W.
Murdock, Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the Economic Meltdown,
41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 801, 854-56 (2010). For a comprehensive list of all of the
competing theories about the causes of the financial crisis, including cheap credit,
deceptive practices, excessive optimism, deregulation of the fmancial industry, and a
list of other reasons, see Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed
Regulatory Reform, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REv., 421, 427-30. Other accounts say there was
a confluence of social intentions and hard business reasons to mask deregulation of the
fmancial industry that would promise economic rewards beyond belief.
225. SeeKATz, supra note 154, at 3-26.
226. See, e.g., Charles Krautharnrner, Catharsis, Then Common Sense, WASH.
POST, Sept. 26, 2008, at A23; Thomas Sowell, Govemment Regulations Nurtured
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, BALT. SUN, Aug. 8, 2007, at llA; Peter J. Wallison,
Bamey Frank, Predatory Lender, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,2009, at A19.
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growth opportunity. 227 Because the White homeowner market was
saturated, those in search of profits through mortgage lending largely
had to focus on under-served markets for profitable growth
opportunities?28 Thus, the accounts that suggest that banks were forced
to lend to these markets are factually wrong. Blacks were sought out as
borrowers for hard business reasons rather than coercion in service of
social policy. 229 There was huge profit to be made from expensive
subprime loans. Blacks and Latinos were targeted by census tract and
ZIP code to receive these loans. 23o "The marketing of subprime loans
[was] highly aggressive, usually commission-based. "231 Thus the nature
of the subprime crisis indicates an organized, systemic paradox-efforts
of inclusion presented an opportunity to exploit. 232

227. See KATZ, supra note 154, at 23-24.
228. Id. at 24.
229. See Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Subprime Mortgages,
Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods 6-7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working
Paper 2009-1, 2009) (showing that minority homeownerships created
with subprime mortgages have proved unstable during periods of rapid price declines).
230.
See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d
513 (N.D. Ohio 20(9); Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp.
2d 702 (D. Md. 2008) (suit alleging FHA violation); Complaint at 10-15, City of
Minneapolis v. TJ Waconia, LLC, 2008 WL 925273 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2008)
(No. 27CV0887880); Complaint, City of Buffalo v. ABN AMRO Mortg. Group, No.
002200/2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 2008), available athttp://www.hppinc.org/l_
uls/resources/Buffalo_Lawsuit.pdf; see also Julie Kay, Empty Homes Spur Cities'
Suits, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 2008, available at http://www.hppinc.org/_
uls/resourceslBuffalo_Lawsuit.pdf; Amos Maki, Council Says OK to City Lawsuit,
COM.
ApPEAL
(Memphis),
Jan.
7,
2009,
available
at
http://
(noting
www.commercialappeal.com/newsI2009/janl07/council-says-ok-to-city-021
approval by Memphis city council for suit against national lenders); Peter Vernon,
Adanta Pursues Lenders that Caused Foreclosed Homes, BANK FORECLOSURES SALE
(Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.bankforeclosuressale.com/wp/article-0422696.html
(noting approval by Atlanta city council).
231. Daniel Lindsey, Prevent People from Wrongfully Losing Their Homes: A
Primer on Mortgage Foreclosure Defense Practice, CHI. B. ASS'N REc., Oct. 2007, at
38,38.
232. According to declarations by two former Wells Fargo employees, they
targeted Black ZIP codes and Black churches for subprime loans, including steering
otherwise prime borrowers into subprime loans. Complaint at 30-36, Mayor of
Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2009) (No. 1:08cv-00062-BEL). One Wells Fargo employee revealed:
Wells Fargo targeted African Americans through special events in African
American communities called 'wealth building' seminars and targeted
African American churches. Wells Fargo steered minority borrowers with
prime credit into subprime loan products, and it did so by incentivizing its
loan officers to originate the highest volume of subprime loans possible.
Gary Klein & Shennan Kavanagh, Causes of the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis and the
Availability of Class Action Responses, 2 NE. U. L.J. 111, 143-44 (2010) (footnote
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Compounding the incentive to exploit was the disaggregation of
ownership of the loans between brokers, lenders, servicers, and Wall
Street investors. This multiple, fragmented ownership interest in a loan
meant that no one along the chain had any long-term interest in the
loans themselves and little incentive to verify their quality or
duration. 233 But the lack of any individual interest in stability of the
loans meant that there was actually a paradoxical interest in instability.
The need for new customers fostered a boom in refmancing as debt was
recycled again and again. 234 Thus, there was a systemic need for a
stable instability: a need that the money funding the loans turn over
quickly and that if (and when) the borrower defaulted, the return of the
property to the bank provided more opportunity for profits to be had
from reselling the homes. The subprime crisis and the mortgage crisis
amply demonstrate that extreme booms lead to extreme busts. The
mortgage crisis also amply demonstrates that Blacks and Latinos for a
number of systemic reasons dwell in the midst of an unstable property
ownership reality, 235 the frontier of a land ownership regime that is
usually stable everywhere else. They also live with the consequences of
this unstable reality.
b. Legacy of captive markets: partitioning of "heir" property

Continuing the rural legacy of exploitative social relationships
centered around race and land has been a variant of predatory
purchasing that does not involve a real estate transaction per se, but
instead one where the vagaries of property law are manipulated to
divest co-owners of inherited property from their homes. Real estate
developers have capitalized on partition laws for co-owned property and
used it to divest longstanding family owners of their property by
exploiting the rules for land that has passed through intestacy to a group

omitted) (citing Affidavit of Elizabeth M. Jacobson ~~ 26-30, Mayor of Baltimore v.
Wells Pargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-00062BEL».
233. See generally Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization
Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257, 1277-78 (2009) (explaining
how securitization encouraged loan originators to pass the risk of inadvisable loans
down the fragmented chain of ownership).
234. See id at 1265 (describing how securitization involved reselling loans
repeatedly) .
235. See Gerardi & Willen, supra note 229, at 2 ("[H]omes purchased with
these types of [subprime] mortgages are lost to foreclosure much more frequently than
those purchased with prime mortgages. "); see also id at 10, 16-18 (evidence from
Massachusetts suggests that subprime lending did not, as commonly believed, lead to a
substantial increase in homeownership by minorities but instead generated turnover in
properties owned by minority residents).
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of heirs. As Thomas Mitchell has amply documented, the developer
usually acquires a share from an heir, who may have even been
unaware of his or her ownership interest, and then uses the share to
petition for partition. 236 Because the courts are unwilling to consider
partition in kind or, in some cases, appropriately deem it impracticable,
the courts order partition sales. The property is put up for auction,
where the only bidder able to afford the acquisition price is the
unscrupulous developer. 237 The original occupants are typically unable
to afford the price to purchase the property at auction. The estimates of
changes in rural Black land ownership are staggering: of "15 million
acres of land acquired by African-Americans after Emancipation, about
2 million remain owned by their descendants. ,,238 Partition sales are
certainly responsible for part of this loss.
The causes are varied but unfamiliarity with property law leaves
Black landowners vulnerable to fraud when they are presented with
misleading legal documents and sign them without knowing that they
are triggering a partition action.239 Co-owners who live far away in
other cities may not even know that they own an interest in the land,
but may unwittingly accept payment for the interest without being
aware of the consequences to the co-owning occupiers of the land. 240
The primary cause of the vulnerability to exploitation has to do with the
use of an accepted but less-than-optimal vehicle of passing ownership of
lalld through intestacy. 241 Studies indicate this may be in part a

236. Mitchell, supra note 18, at 508.
237. Lewan & Barclay, supra note 220; Persky, supra note 160, at 46.
238. Persky, supra note 160, at 46; see also Lewan et aI., supra note 149 ("The
number of white farmers has declined, over the last century too, as economic trends
have concentrated land in fewer, often corporate, hands. However, black ownership has
declined two times faster than white ownership .... ").
239. Lewan & Barclay, supra note 220.
240. See id.
Land traders who buy shares of estates with the intention of forcing
partition sales are abusing the law, according to a 1985 Commerce
Department study.
The practice is legal but 'clearly unscrupulous,' declared the study, which
was conducted for the department by the Emergency Land Fund, a
nonprofit group that helped Southern blacks retain threatened land in the
1970s and '80s.
Id. For example "[t]he Becketts .. .lost a 335-acre farm in Jasper County, S.C., that
had been in their family since 1873. And the Sanders clan watched helplessly as a
timber company recently acquired 300 acres in Pickens County, Ala., that had been in
their family since 1919." Id.
241. See Mitchell, supra note 18, at 521.
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reflection of lack of financial resources to access legal representation. 242
Others are reluctant to leave wills, even where there are resources, for
fear of causing discord within the family. 243 The statistics indicate that
forced partition sales have been a significant aspect of Black rural land
10ss.244 The properties have gone on to be turned into industrial
developments, hotels, and housing developments worth millions of
dollars. 245 The former owners have been left with nothing but a legacy
of lost family history and investment.
The hidden facilitator, however, has been property law. Though
resorting to market-based property mechanisms, such as the partition
sale, seem expedient and fair, they are actually a mismatch for the
interests that one would usually expect to be protected by property
law.246 For example, the whole regime of co-ownership is based on the
idea that many people have access to and control of a resource. In the
case of family ownership, property law has traditionally sought to
enable the family to manage property on behalf of family interests.
Thus, it seems that the formalism of the ownership of a number of
shares should not be used to defeat the interests of the persons who
reside on the farm and are responsible for the management and upkeep,
not having sought or received compensation for their efforts. 247 All of
242. Lewan & Barclay, supra note 220 ("[S]tudies show black landowners in
the South are especially vulnerable because up to 83 percent of them do not leave
wills-perhaps because rural blacks often lack equal access to the legal system. H);
Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the Nonnalization of Rural Black Land Loss: A
Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 WIS. L. REv. 557, 596 ("More extensive
empirical research would help legal scholars determine whether the fourteen cases
analyzed by the AP serve the role of a miner's canary or whether the AP cases are
simply dramatically heartrending, but ultimately unrepresentative. H).
243. Persky, supra note 160, at 46.
244. Lewan & Barclay, supra note 220 ("Mitchell and others who have studied
black land ownership estimate that thousands of black families have lost millions of
acres through partition sales in the last 30 years. H); Persky, supra note 160, at 46.
245. See Dolores Barclay et aI., Tom from the Land Series (pt. 1), in THE
AUTHENTIC VOICE 185, 187-88 (2006).
246. See Mitchell, Malpezzi, & Green, supra note 75, 610, 617-18 (arguing
that the partition sale is a type of forced sale to which lower and middle income
property owners are disproportionately exposed and likely to receive wealth-depleting,
below-market compensation for the value of their property); see also Mitchell, supra
note 18, at 556 (highlighting the inadequacies of tenant in common law as compared to
condominium and cooperative ownership law which allows "property-owning groups"
to utilize consensual agreements to limit the rights of alienation to "promote
'community'H).
247. Consider pre- and post-colonial systems of land tenure loosely referred to
as "family land" in the Caribbean and Africa. See DEMYSTIFYING THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL: LAND TENURE AND POVERTY IN AFRICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 151 (Robert
Home & Hilary Lim eds., Cavendish Publishing 2004) (describing how family land
practices continue to survive in the Caribbean and Africa); NEGOTIATING MODERNITY:
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these are values that are perfectly cognizable within property, but the
market mechanism of using a sale to divest the occupants shows
property law's implicit presumption in favor of instability.

E. The Racially Predatory Dynamic: The Role of "'Othering" in Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, or "'Markets Need Suckers"

The stories of the Black experience with entering into market
relationships for land ownership compellingly reveal that markets, in
order to provide profit, are based on (1) what can be nicely referred to
as information asymmetries 248 and (2) a consistent lack of good faith
and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied
in every contract and attempts to set a threshold standard of behavior
for the parties rather than allow them to resort to formalism to engage
in insincere, opportunistic breach. 249 Contract law is traditionally silent
about the level of good faith and fair dealing required at contract
formation. 250 Although strict freedom-of-contract principles might
suggest that voluntary choice or assent is all that is required, there is a
basic, implied assumption or expectation that people will enter into
contracts with those from whom they can expect good faith and fair
dealing. Yet bad faith, unfair dealing, and exploitation are an underappreciated reality of contracting for people who are susceptible to
AFRICA'S AMBIVALENT EXPERIENCE 179-82 (Elisio Salvado Macamo ed., 2005)
(describing Ihe evolution from communal fonns of land tenure, where family consent
was required for transfer, even of self-acquired land, to a more individualized system).
See generally Jean Besson, Symbolic Aspects of Land in the Caribbean: The Tenure
and Transmission of Land Rights among Caribbean Peasantries, in PEASANTS,
PLANTATIONS AND RURAL COMMUNITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN 86 (Malcolm Cross &
Arnaud Marks eds., 1979) (explaining land tenure, transfer, and inheritance in a
number of West Indian countries).
248. According to Raj Patel, "we do not pay the social costs of Ihe way we
eat," for example. Morning Edition, Capitalism Overload and the Value of Nothing,
(NPR radio broadcast Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/storylstory.php?storyId= 122125016. In his book, he considers Ihe
alternatives to Ihe free market for valuing resources. "We know Ihe price of everyIhing
and the value of noIhing." RAJ PATEL, THE VALUE OF NOTHING: How TO RESHAPE
MARKET SOCIETY AND REDEFINE DEMOCRACY 3 (2009). He notes Ihat Greek democracy
never had elections; Ihe Government was run by citizens. Morning Edition, supra.
According to Patel, "we've been deskilled by our transfonnation into consumers raIher
than citizens." Id
249. See D.C.C. § 1-304 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
205 (1981). See generally GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
250. See Stephen A. Plass, Bargain A voidance in a Competitive Bargain
Market: The Car Sales Conundrum, 2 WYo. L. REv. 1, 5 (2002) ("Principles of good
faiIh and the honesty associated wiIh it respond more to the 'perfonnance' and
'enforcement' aspects of the deal and offer little help wiIh 'formation misconduct.'"
(footnotes omitted».
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being "othered. ,,251 Indeed, some are consistently othered while some
are consistently "we'd" or "us'd." For example, Beryl Satter observed
that the contract for deed exploiters in Chicago reserved one form of
behavior for the Blacks and one for everyone else. 252
Why? The explanation is tri-fold. Carol Brown's work illustrates
one partial explanation: cultural affinity. Brown argues that racial
exploitation in transactions is influenced by the cultural distortion and
perceptions on behalf of lenders that discount objective loan
qualifications and override them with negative racial stereotypes. 253 In
effect, the identity of the "in group" is created by those who are kept
out. This is a related but modified concept of Cheryl Harris's
"Whiteness as Property" proposition. 254 Instead, this is "Whiteness as
the Identity That Binds Us." That means that market transactions are
culturally specific in ways we have yet to fully acknowledge. Property
doctrine, which has evolved to facilitate market transactions, thus
inevitably facilitates culturally or racially specific market transactions.
A second explanation is provided by Carol Brown and Beryl
Satter's related theories about how group formation involves identifying
who is entitled to good behavior and who is a ripe target for predatory
behavior. Satter notes that the problem seems to be that "professional
bulwarks of a stable community-bankers who loaned, realtors who
guided, and attorneys who advised-all turned into predators when the
client was black. ,,255 She notes the contrast between the Real Estate
Board's Code of Ethics, which encourages ownership and stability, and
speculators, often made up of the city's White professional class, who
"sold properties on terms that made home ownership almost
impossible. ,,256 According to Satter, "the city's white professional class
saw [blacks] as entirely outside the bounds of ethical consideration. In
the white-dominated fields of real estate, law, and banking, professional
251. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994); EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM (1978).
252. SATTER, supra note 167, at 69.
253. See Carol Neco1e Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93
MARQ. L. REv. 907, 951 (2010). Brown explains how cultural affinity theory illustrates
that whites tend to be endowed with positive perceptions and blacks with negative that
may be used to ignore credit deficiencies for white and ignore ample credit
qualifications for Blacks: "lenders discriminate against borrowers with whom they do
not have a cultural affinity or experiential background because they frod it more
difficult, specifically more costly, to evaluate these borrowers' creditworthiness when
compared to borrowers with whom they share the same cultural affinity." Id.
254. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 171314 (1993).
255. SATTER, supra note 167, at 64.
256. Id. at 69.
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ethics applied to whites only .... [Thus] the treatment that ... black
clients received broke no rules at all. ,,257 Satter's work also illustrates
that predatory behavior is simply fun. 258
The other prong of the explanation of othering in good faith and
fair dealing is an instrumental, economic explanation illustrated by Ian
Ayres's work on car dealerships and racial discrimination in bargaining
and contracting: markets need suckers. His study documented persistent
"revenue-based" discrimination against Blacks during auto purchasing,
fmdings which are quite relevant for understanding the "why" of
predatory behavior towards Blacks. The key insight from this concept is
that "race and gender serve as proxies to inform sellers about how
much individual consumers would be willing to pay for the car.,,259
According
to
Ayres,
"market competition among
[car]
the
opportunities
for
statistical
dealerships ... reinforce[s]
discrimination. ,,260 Ayres's research generated anecdotal evidence
suggesting that:
at some dealerships up to 50 percent of the profits can be
earned on just 10 percent of the sales. Profit concentrations of
this magnitude are crucial in understanding why competition
does not eliminate revenue-based price discrimination. From a
dealer's perspective, bargaining for cars is a "search for
suckers" -a search for consumers who are willing to
pay . ... 261

Thus a Black customer, by virtue of his or her racial identity,
wears on his or her face a stereotype of a fruitful prime target for a
sucker sale. Ayres recommends that reform is needed to eliminate car
"dealer[s'] incentive[s] to price discriminate ... [by making] it
profitable for dealerships to commit instead to low-markup, high257. [d.
258. [d. at 74. ("It was like people who like to go out and shoot lions in Africa.
It was the same thrill . . .. The thrill of the chase and the kill." (internal quotation
marks omitted».
259. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 52 (2001).
260. [d. at 80.
26l. [d. at 81-82 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Ayres further observes:
[D]ealerships are willing to force the majority of consumers to endure
frustrating and socially wasteful bargaining in hopes of finding those few
high-profit sales that disproportionately contribute to their bottom line. For
the dealers, the competitive incentive to move away from bargaining to a
stated-price system simply may not be compelling because dealerships
would thereby lose the profits from sucker sales.
[d. at 82 (footnote omitted).
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volume strategies. ,,262 This insight is useful in the predatory land
bargaining category because it confirms what is easily intuited from
anecdotal experience: there is a big "sucker" factor in markets, and
based on actions of a few, predictions are made about entire groups
based on stereotypes. It is financially worthwhile for those in search of
profitable bargains to search for those high-profit people.
Property law cannot be understood separately from the reality of
markets for property. Though the goal of property is access, stability,
and the ability to alienate, the underlying theory of markets requires
some instability in property ownership separate and apart from any
individual decision to alienate. In other words, it does not seem
profitable enough to wait for someone to initiate voluntary arms-length
agreements to transfer ownership. Thus, actors seek to find ways to
facilitate or hasten transfer of property out of someone's hands into
their own. It is therefore important to exploit disparities in information
in order to create profitable, exploitable disparities in power. Race is a
roadmap for easy profit through fraud and exploitation. Unsurprisingly,
segregated communities serve as prime hunting grounds to locate
appropriate collections of suckers. 263
F Racial Geography: Stability of Using Race as a Predictor of
Opportunities for Profit

1. RACIAL SEGREGATION MAKES IT SIMPLE

Property ownership varies based on racial geography. There is a
difference in duration, quality of life, and protection of civil liberties:
the distribution of the sticks in the bundle varies by the physical space
one occupies. 264 Reciprocally, geography is determined by race and
class. It became part of the profit model to identify and target
"customers," victims, or shills by race. While law and development
theorists posit that stable property ownership is the predicate to
development, not all communities enjoy that kind of stable ownership
or beneficial development. Instead, Black communities are often, to a
262. Id. at 126.
263. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans:
Racialized Consumer Fraud & Reverse Rediining, 18 J.L. & POL'y 121, 124, 152
(2009) (discussing the ability for anti-discrimination and consumer-protection law to
address the use of racially targeted geo-demographic marketing).
264. See, e.g., Jonathan Glick, Gentrification and the RaciaJized Geography of
Home Equity, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 280, 280 (2008) ("[G]entrification is restructuring
racial disparity in home equity building ... affecting the relative wealth levels of
Black and Latino homeowners .... [G]entrification encourages net migration toward
other parts of the metropolitan area where home equity gains are lower. ").
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lesser or greater extent, disconnected from the mainstream of the
economy, and by virtue of their disconnection and racialized identity,
more prone to exploitation. The result borne of an ultimately zero-sum
game perspective is destructive, unsustainable, and unfair. This raises
the questions how and why?
Much literature explains how: the legacy of overt and covert
systemized practices and laws has given rise to significant racial and
economic segregation in the United States. 265 Today, many seemingly
neutral legal rules reinforce these geographically predictable realities of
segregation in and between cities and suburbs266 (although that reality is
becoming more heterogeneous in certain respects as elite suburbs are
able to retain their exclusive, predominately White character, but
working-class, inner-ring suburbs abandoned by Whites are
increasingly Black). 267 This overall racialized landscape has been
created through legal and extra-legal devices to shape geographical
reality and limit behavior to racialized geographic patterns, such as
racially restrictive covenants and government-sponsored racially
exclusionary redlining.268 It has been maintained by land use and zoning
rules that unquestioningly ratify the exclusion of multi-family housing
to protect middle- and upper-class homeowners and promote
environmental racism through expulsive zoning, locating undeserving
or hazardous uses in and near Black communities. 269 Local government
jurisdictional practices such as municipal underbounding,270 the

265. See FREUND, supra note 166, at 41-42.
266. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 241-45 (1985) (describing the use of zoning to perpetuate racial
and economic segregation in cities and suburbs).
267. See MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN
REALITY 40 (2002) (using the incidence of federally subsidized school lunch as an
indicator of decline of older, working class, inner-ring suburbs).
268. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 111-18 (2004) (describing the federal
government's role in housing fmance, highway construction, and public housing
construction that was racially segregative).
269. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REv.
739, 757-64 (1993) (describing the disparate denial of protective zoning to Black
communities); Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transfonnative Politics of the Environmental Justice
Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775, 792-98 (1998) (explaining the political economy of
locating undesirable hazardous land uses in Black and Latino communities).
270. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1101-15 (2007) (describing the
phenomenon of legally unincorporated rural areas occupied by Black communities,
contiguous to existing predominately White towns, that are impoverished and
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city/suburb divide, and free incorporation of towns lead to hoarding of
tax resources 271 and make segregation seem natural and inevitable.
Integration through gentrification also seems natural while it capitalizes
on racial segregation's depressive effect on inner-city property values.
It also is often spurred on by property value appraisal practices that use
a type of "gerrymandering" to create White comparables and separate
property markets. 272 Even commercial retailers and residential real
estate developers use a scientific method, geo-demography, to evaluate
race and class characteristics to make location decisions. 273

2.

THE RECIPROCAL BENEFITS OF AN UNSTABLE FRONTIER

Ironically, there is a benefit of this unstable reality to the system.
A decayed frontier provides a ready contrast to the idyllic suburbs or
the cool, "hip-happening" urban neighborhood while also providing a
ripe opportunity for low-cost, depressed-value, and high-profIt-potential
acquisition. The fact that some properties can be sold above any
reasonable market value to certain unsuspecting buyers suggests that
opportunity for growth and profit must, to some extent, happen at the
expense of others. The result is that our group expectations, racial
segregation, and a market unfettered by protections for owners against
the ease of alienation result in a recurring crisis of stability in the same
places over different periods of time. Thus, the most ironic aspect of
this contradictory reality is the possibility that the reality of instability
for some may promote stability in the rest of the system. Thus, one
disadvantage structurally reinforces the other.
shockingly underdeveloped because they are separated from the municipal services and
access to governance that otherwise would make sense).
271. The federal government encouraged the free incorporation of towns so
they could zone exclusively. See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept:
The Problem of Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29
CARDOZO L. REv. 1193, 1258 (2008) (noting the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
issued in 1926 by the U.S. Department of Commerce "made clear that zoning was no
longer the exclusive prerogative of the cities, but could be freely exercised by any
incorporated municipality"); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19-23, 39-58 (1990) (describing the
interrelationship of local fiscal disparities in property-tax-based education funding and
exclusionary zoning as illustrative of the significant race and class inequities and
inefficiencies of local control); see also id. at 111 ("Contemporary federal doctrines of
local government law and state-local relations are highly congruent with the localism
that marks most state legal systems. ").
272. See generally GUY STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE
LENDING INDUSTRY IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (2003).
273. See Audrey G. McFarlane, JWJo Fits the Profile?: Thoughts on Race,
Class, Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 877, 884-86 (2006), for
an extensive explanation of this method.
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If instability is endemic to property law, then it must reshape our
understanding of what property law is about and what it is protects.
Rather than protecting stability for all, property law protects stability
for some at the expense of predictability for others. As demonstrated by
the alternative reality to property ownership, the instability and stability
inherent in property ownership seems largely due to the fact that
property principles are designed to encourage investment and promote
markets. Markets inherently need instability, which is supplied by a
number of factors. People are mobile and wish to sell or acquire. Also,
circumstances change and people have a fmancial need to sell. As a
systemic matter, Beryl Satter's thorough description and documenting
of the installment land-sales system illustrates the twin paradox that is
at work: a racially associated decline was fmancially lucrative and was
accompanied by an inherent systemic reinforcement by virtue of the
financial benefits provided through a transfer of resources to White
professionals, which thus reinforced their financial resources.274
According to Satter, many of the city's prominent citizens, "attorneys,
bankers, realtors, and politicians alike" were involved.275 There was
also a functioning secondary market where the "contract paper" was
sold off to investors. The investors, typically including professionals
such as doctors and lawyers, received an income-generating contract,
and the speculator received more cash to acquire more houses. 276 Also,
the speculator provided a service to Whites who owned properties in
redlined neighborhoods. Even though they paid below market, they at
least provided an option to the White property owner to get his money
out of the property and move to the suburbs. 277
To the extent instability is structural and is predictably destructive
and reinforcing of racial and economic disadvantage, it strips the moral
and instrumental underpinnings of the stability justification underlying
property as a democratic institution for distributing material wealth in a
society through widespread ownership. As the subprime crisis and the
larger mortgage foreclosure crisis are teaching us, too much instability
threatens to up-end the system and turns property markets into a force
for destruction rather than one for good or social utility. All of property
law's protections for the owners left standing lose their moral force and

274. SATfER, supra note 167, at 6.
275. [d.
276. [d. at 59.
277. [d. at 71-72. According to Satter, this was but a part of the "broad range
of complicity" from the not insignificant profits the speculators brought to the city's
banks to the captive, explosive market for housing for Blacks created by redlining (both
by the FHA and the banks) to the "ordinary white Chicagoans who harassed black
families who dared move into their neighborhoods." [d. at 75.
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justification. At the very least, we must acknowledge that property's
instability effectuates redistribution. Security in one area is obtained at
the expense of insecurity in another. That inherent instability has been
largely ignored is an invitation to look at history and more broadly at
the destabilizing effect of markets on property ownership. There should
be no reason for property ownership to be as spatially contextual as it
is. It is due, in part, to race and class segregation and the fact that
certain property owners do not do well in market transactions. Yet, it
may also be due to the instability inherent in property doctrine's
embrace of property markets. The "why" of instability is that property
markets need turnover for growth. Even though rapid turnover is
destructive, and if large enough, systemically destabilizing, the need
and impetus towards these behaviors have been so consistently
prevalent in so many different contexts that property doctrine must
begin to take note.
III. THE MISSING STICK IN THE BUNDLE: THE RIGHT TO KEEP

As this Article has demonstrated, property as viewed through the
stability paradigm delivers far less than it promises. 278 A landownership system based purely on a policy to foster real estate markets
through unfettered alienation has led to not only a foreclosure crisis,
but also to a crisis in the legitimacy of a property system premised on
the rhetoric of stability. The systemic pervasiveness of dispossession or
defeasance of property ownership, particularly when concentrated in
particular social subgroups, presents a grave threat to the coherence of
property as a social institution in a democratic society. Just as the
transition from family dynasties recognized the toxicity for society as a
whole of pure or absolute stability, so must we recognize the toxicity
for recurring groups of people of absolute fluidity of alienation.
Instability is part of property, but incorporating the exploitation by the
humans who make up the real estate markets means the system is off
balance. Though the dynamic of change is necessary in a system
predicated on alienation, when that dynamic is premised on outsized,
destructive profits, it undermines the foundations of property. Distorted
notions of "freedom of contract" have left property powerless to make
good on its premise of stability.
Carol Rose's seminal work on the interaction of crystalline, hard
rules and muddy, flexible equitable principles based on reasonableness
278. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1011 (2009) ("[The subprime crisis]
challenges our conceptions of both property and property law. How should property
law respond to this crisis in property ownership?").
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or fairness provides a clear map for the way to rebalance the "yin" of
stability with the "yang" of instability. 279 She found that hard-edged,
crystalline rules arise to sharply defme rights and entitlements when
parties do not have long-term relationships, trust, or familiarity with
one another. 280 Eventually these rules give way to judge-made
modifications after the unanticipated effects of hardship and forfeiture
from the strict application becomes apparent. 281 Accordingly, today,
property rules have been hard-edged and insufficiently attentive to the
needs of non-repeat-player bargaining parties, as exemplified by the
experience of Blacks and Latinos over time in the real estate market.
Rose argues that we tend to have both types of rules over time,
depending on the historical cycle. 282 The muddiness has not happened
sufficiently in this context. The historical cycle which we are currently
experiencing is one that geographer David Harvey has argued is
characterized by an economic system dominated by "accumulation by
dispossession. ,,283 Therefore, building on Rose's insights, when
considering a hardship or forfeiture by a homeowner, it makes sense, at
a general level, to refme a stick in the bundle while blurring a
crystalline rule. 284
"When a court introduces ambiguity into the fixed rules that
the parties initially adopted, it in effect reinstates the kind of
weighing, balancing, and reconsidering that the parties might
have undertaken if they had been in some longer-term
relationship with each other. ,,285

279.
280.
281.

See Rose, supra note 80.
/d. at 602-03.
/d. at 600 ("Fools on the one side and sharp dealers on the other ... are
central players in the crystal-to-mud story, because they are the characters most likely
to have a leading role in the systematic overloading of crystalline rules. ").
282. See id at 595 (citing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
146-49 (1979)).
See DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 137-82 (2003).
Ayres and Talley describe adverse selection and moral hazard as twin
evils: remedying one improvidently can inadvertently lead to the other. See Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Divieling a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1085 (1995) ("Attempts to remedy adverse
selection often exacerbate moral hazard .... Thus, policymakers often face a trade-off
in choosing legal rules to constrain the twin evils." (footnote omitted)).
285. Rose, supra note 80, at 608-09. "Mud rules mimic a pattern of post hoc
readjustments that people would make if they were in an ongoing relationship with each
other. People in such relationships would hardly dupe their trading partners out of their
titles, sell them defective goods, or fail to make minor readjustments on debts." /d at
602.
CONTRACT

283.
284.
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The first step in addressing the imbalance between stability and
instability is to look to the sticks-in-the-bundle metaphor, which
although reflecting a transactional vision of property, is quite helpful in
delineating what we ought to get when we get property. The experience
of minorities in property markets illustrates that the right to alienate
involves both an implied right to acquire286 and a right to keep. The
concept of the right to acquire recognizes that the Fair Housing Act's
anti-discrimination principles in real estate transactions mean that the
principle of anti-discrimination advances a notion of a legally protected
right to acquire property without one's racial identity (or other
protected identities) being a factor in the seller's decision not to sell?87
Fundamentally, the notion that there is a "right to keep" is an
important recognition of another important, under-theorized stick in the
bundle of property rights. It is a necessary corollary of all of the other
sticks in the bundle because it is fundamental for continuing to own
property. The ability to continue to own property until one is ready to
part with it reflects and maintains social relations between people. This
right to keep could be secured by legislation, but also should be
explored by critically examining ways for the courts to use common
law equitable principles to refuse to recognize transactions and
instruments that involve exploitation and develop robust notions of
quasi-fraud.
Therefore, the right to keep is a logical extension of another aspect
of a stick in the bundle, the right to be free from expropriation. This
"stick" or "strand" in the bundle of property rights has focused
primarily on the right to be free from a landowner taking over portions
of your parcel through encroaching structures. 28B Yet the recurring

286. See Public Accommodations, supra note 22, at 1451.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Urban Site Venture II Ltd. P'ship v. Levering Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship, 665 A.2d 1062, 1063, 1065-67 (Md. 1995) (noting that "[t]he preferred
remedy for encroachment is an injunction ordering removal of the encroaching
structure" but refusing to order removal of parking garage that minimally encroached
on an adjoining parcel because the encroachment was innocent, the cost to the owner
was minimal ($200) and the cost of removal was high ($500,000)). A number of
property doctrines also reflect the implicit guarantee of the right to be free from
expropriation. The longstanding recognition of the tort of trespass, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965), and actions to recover real property such as the
actions of ejectment or to quiet title reflect the basic guarantees of property ownership.
See, e.g., Woodland Grove Baptist Church v. Woodland Grove Cmty. Cemetery
Assn, 947 So.2d 1031 (Ala. 2006) (suit to quiet title to cemetery); Tioga Coal Co. v.
Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1988) (extensively discussing the
relationship of ejectment and adverse possession). Also, the disfavoring of ouster in the
law is reflected by rights to regain access to property where one has been wrongfully
ousted by a co-owner, and ouster by a prior adverse possessor disables the availability
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stories of exploitative property relationships strongly indicate the
concern for and interest in expropriation is broader. The hungry animal
at the gate for someone' s home is ever present. The history of Blacks
and property ownership makes equitable goals and principles important.
First, starting out as property themselves, Blacks have tried to acquire
the promised autonomy, wealth creation, and independence of private
property ownership, but they have been subject to a specific kind of
predation reserved especially for them. 289 Culturally, they are not
deemed as part of the group that deserves fair treatment, and in fact
they are treated as if they deserve exploitation. When such a situation
recurs again and again over time to the point that it becomes part of the
business model, equity is called for. Blacks in transactions are treated
as objects and not subjects. If we look at this from an equity
perspective, the historic significance of equity demands that the history
of racism and segregation should be an important basis for invoking
equitable considerations. 290 The history of Black ownership in the
United States teaches us that the right to keep must be directly
considered and protected.
Another place from which to construct or assemble a more open
recognition of the implied right to keep should be through contract's
unconscionability doctrine. Property doctrine works in tandem with
contract doctrine to define the methodology and vehicle for transfer of
interests in property. Whereas transfer was limited by particular
relationships during the feudal era, the era of free transferability in
service of markets is characterized by no limits on parties or terms or
division of interests. 291 A dramatic importation of contract principles
into property took place when the Implied Warranty of Habitability was

of tacking together adverse possessory periods of time. See, e.g., Woodland Grove
Baptist Church, 947 So.2d at 1036 (explaining the purpose of suit to quiet title); Sack
v. Tomlin, 871 P.2d 298,306 (Nev. 1994) (a cotenant out of possession has the right to
receive rent if there has been ouster). If someone attempts to swindle or take your
home, the crime of deed theft is intended to protect against attempting to steal property
through fraud, forgery, or trick. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat'] Trust Co. v. Jituboh,
No. 28958,2006, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 726 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2009) (discussing
options to protect against deed theft).
289. See discussion supra Part II. D .1.
290. This notion is well-supported by established maxims of equity such as:
"equity delights to do justice and not by halves," 30A C.J.S. Equity § 129 (2007),
"equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy," id. § 130, "equity regards that
as done which ought to be done," id. § 131, and "equity regards substance rather than
form," id. § 133.
291. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 494-502 (1989).
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read into every residential lease agreement. 292 If we return to Judge
Skelley Wright's opinion reading contract principles into the landlordtenant relationship, we see that the doctrine was created for a
progressive purpose: to advance property doctrine into more rational
recognition of the realities of modem property ownership and to
rebalance assumptions and expectations that more closely reflect best
practices from contract law. 293 This was a groundbreaking thought
because contract principles, in effect, read plausibly beneficial norms
into property in two respects. On the one hand, they introduced an
aspect of the norm of gentlemanly behavior and expectations formerly
reserved to the wealthy; they elevated the tenant to a customer and the
landlord to a proprietor. On the other hand, they also introduced
process-based norms of arms-length bargaining, that the bargained
contract is the good contract because the process ensures that the
outcome reflects the parties' intentions. For better or worse, the
doctrine was meant to assure tenants that they had a right to expect a
specific product that met minimum standards of decency. 294 The stories
demonstrate that episodes of divestment recur again and again for
particular groups of people. Nothwithstanding the process assumptions,
the realities of markets are different. Rather than gentlemanly behavior,
exploitation and searching for exploitable contracting parties is the
norm.
A. Unconscionability and the Inequality ofBargaining Power

Unconscionability doctrine is well known for displacing a
fundamental assumption of equality in bargaining power between the
parties to a contract. 295 Arms-length bargaining is assumed to bring

292. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
293. See id. at 1080 ("[T]he old common law rule imposing an obligation upon
the lessee to repair during the lease term was really never intended to apply to
residential urban leaseholds. Contract principles established in other areas of the law
provide a more rational framework for the apportionment of landlord-tenant
responsibilities .... ").
294. As discussed above, the implied warranty of habitability faces structural
and procedural limits that have rendered it ineffective and subordinating to the
population of tenants it was meant to serve. See Super, supra note 17, at 430-37
(arguing that low-income tenants should not be required to pay rent into escrow to
invoke contractual tenant defenses).
295. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 537 (1967) ("It is out of these special attributes of
land, making up the Gestaltof real property (as opposed to the 'goods' of the Code),
that there arise those repeated dramatic vignettes with which the Chancellors were
continually faced-the abused old and unsophisticated young, the slicker and the
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about a result that reflects the intentions of the parties and makes both
better off, while promoting social utility. 296 But because markets depend
on imperfection (i.e., information asymmetries), bargaining, in effect,
brings the exploitative nature of the market 297 into the property
relationship. The relatively few cases indicate that the protection of
unconscionability doctrine is weak. 298 This probably makes ironic sense
since unconscionability doctrine runs directly counter to the underlying
needs for exploitability. It is as effective as the takings doctrine in that
it tries to define where someone has gone too far. 299 Unconscionability
doctrine as a private-takings principle signals aspirationally when
someone has gone too far. The facts from the stories of the Black
experience of owning property are well known, with the exploitative
aspects justified by "freedom of contract" where the common law
explicitly endorses the use of informational disadvantages on the
implied theory that it leads to an efficient result. 3°O Economic market
theories use perfect markets as their models (assuming rational
bargaining parties and no asymmetries in the information possessed by
farmer, the money lender and the expectant heir. This cast of characters, to a large
extent determined by the nature of the commodity, led to the various forms of
overreaching which, while not quite adding up to fraud or duress, formed the pictures
of bargaining processes which the chancellors declared 'unconscionable.' But mark: all
of these are pictures of individual overreachings. In other words, more important than
the uniqueness of each piece of land (but connected with it) is the uniqueness of each
land transaction. The dramatic situations which were presented and decided under the
equity unconscionability doctrine were most particularly those kinds of overreaching
which take place, and can only take place, when there is individualized bargaining. The
equity criteria are fitted only to nonmass transactions." (footnote omitted».
296. Spencer Nathan Thal, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The
Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairoess, 8 OXFORD J. OF LEG. STUD. 17,22 (1988)
("[F]reedom of contract doctrine should not be accepted as a validating principle for
contracts which arise as a result of exploitation .... [T]he most significant
problem .. .is ... formulating a coherent definition of exploitation. Such a definition is
essential in order to maintain the limited nature of the claim. ").
297. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY 17, 8990 (2005) (arguing that markets are socially constructed and that the housing market is
entirely constructed by the state).
298. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 295, at 536 ("Most important, real property is
likely to be the only thing that relatively unsophisticated people have which is worth
tricking them out of. Farmers have farms and old ladies have old homesteads. The
equity cases are replete with factual patterns involving the old being bilked, and farmers
sweet-talked into ruinous trades. Courts would be most solicitous to impede land
transfers by the poor sillies of the world." (footnotes omitted».
299. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking. ").
300. See U.C.c. § 2-302 cmt. 1 ("The principle is one of prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise and not [one] of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power. ").
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them).301 Unconscionability doctrine's narrow definition of inequality of
bargaining power is harmfully inadequate however because: (1) it
requires subjects of exploitation to prove they were dumb and weak
(i.e., "suckers") in order to fit within the doctrine's guidance to judges
about when to scrutinize a transaction more closely, 302 and, failing that,
(2) it allows contract law to be otherwise predicated on a myth of
equality, which reinforces the hand of the stronger bargaining party by
treating the sucker's uninformed decision as a voluntary choice that he
or she has made. 303 Freedom of contract makes inequalities of fortune
and outcome the just result of this exercise regardless of whether it
occurs to the same people again and again with unquestionably
exploitative behavior involved. Thus, freedom of contract currently
means freedom of exploitation. When property incorporates contract
principles, it incorporates this reality, which is in direct contradiction to
our high hopes for property's stability paradigm.
Unconscionability doctrine, as it is currently configured, ultimately
serves a role of preserving dispossession opportunities. By
incorporating contract and free-alienation policies, property supports
and facilitates a systemic need for profitable exploitation. It is a limited
exception to the notion of freedom of contract that has the added benefit
of preventing embarrassment of the system. It protects the system from
exposing the systematized, rank, unjustifiable exploitation of so many
transactions into which Black people enter. The concept of inequality of
bargaining power dances around the issue: it ignores the predation of
some on others because of factors the latter cannot control, over which
they do not exercise voluntary choice. The inclination towards
predation on certain people has to be taken into account. Perhaps we
need to recognize that, while theoretically anyone can be a predator and
anyone can be a target, the evidence shows that predators' selections
for targets use the consequences of exclusion to Blacks to target and
pillage at will. In the case of the recent subprime crisis, they did not
stop until a worldwide credit crisis occurred and the game was over. 304
For now.

301. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Infonnation, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1981).
302. See Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in
Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 889, 935 (1997).
303. See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive:
Enforcing Contractual Myths despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L.
& Bus. 617, 670-73 (2009).
304. See, for example, supra note 158, for discussion of foreclosure rescue
fraud.
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B. Fix Contract Doctrine: Shift the Burden of Proof of
"Unconscionability" for Enforcement

In contract doctrine, courts do not examine the fairness of a
particular transaction, except where the enforcing party seeks specific
perfonnance, which can only be granted if the contract is fair. 305
According to Emily Sherwin, this departure from treating contract as a
matter of voluntary exchange can be explained by an unstated
recognition that the announced legal rules for binding, enforceable
contracts may be publicly useful for guiding the conduct of contracting
parties. 306 But equitable considerations like fairness can be drawn upon
by judicial decision-makers when they are called on to enforce rules
and avoid specific enforcement in favor of a damages remedy. 307 Thus,
fairness considerations are available in contract enforcement, albeit
under limited circumstances. As she observes:
courts continue to say there is a distinction in the moral
standards applicable to legal and equitable relief; opinions
repeatedly assert that specific performance is discretionary
and may be withheld on the basis of unfairness that would not
affect a damage remedy. The second Restatement also
preserves the special standard for equitable relief in
unquestioning terms. 308
Emily Sherwin has also discussed a separate but compelling
concept in the context of property doctrine: the "incidents of
ownership" concept. 309 These incidents of ownership are governed by
freedom of contract and the right of alienation. Her point relates to the
assumed ability, under freedom of contract's assumption of voluntary
choice, of an individual owner to decide whether to sell or buy.
Sherwin's observations, when combined, suggest that the incidents of
ownership are governed by freedom of contract, but a supposed right of
alienation (ie. power to transfer) could be extended to protecting the
decision-making power of whether to sell or buy. Understanding the
full incidents of ownership should enable courts to take into account
equitable considerations implicit in the notion of a right to keep. Thus

305. See Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD.
L. REv. 253, 258-59 (1991).
306.
Id. at 306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id. at 261 (footnote omitted).
Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29

309.
ST. L.J. 1075, 1092-93 (1997).

ARIZ.
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recognition of the right to keep would involve shifting
unconscionability's inquiries to rebalance in light of the realities of
bargains between repeat industry players and novices to land
transactions. The key may also be to begin to assign responsibilities for
bargaining to each party to consider the other's welfare. 31O Thus, in
order to neutralize the negative impact of the market, we need to
consider shifting the presumptions in contract enforcement to
meaningfully take into account unconscionable terms (e.g., toxic
subprime loans); unconscionable relationships (e.g., repeat players,
such as brokers who overreached); and unconscionable outcomes (e.g.,
disproportionate loss as compared to the nature of or reasons for the
breach). In addition, we could also switch the presumptions in
unconscionability doctrine and shift the burden to put the onus on
sophisticated repeat players to prove their deals are fair. 311
C. Fix Property Doctrine: Consider Restraining Alienation-Quia
Emptores Meets Numerus Clausus

The Statute Quia Emptores of 1290312 paved the way for alienation
as we know it today by prohibiting subinfeudation and authorizing
alienation by substitution. 313 "A tenant could no longer convey part of
his estate but could convey all of it by means of a substitution of
holders of the tenancy ... , ,,314 The goal was to preserve the rights of
the landlord, but it inadvertently paved the way for the end of feudalism
and the rise of property markets. Implicit in the Quia Emptores was the
notion that there should be a limited number of property

310. I borrow this insight from Peter Gerhart, Professor, Case Western
Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks on Exclusion and the Duty to Others at the
Association for Law, Property, and Society Annual Meeting, Workshop on Property,
Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 5, 2011). His remarks were based on his
forthcoming book Property and Social Morality.
311. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose
Information: Lessons Leamed from the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 79, 83 (2008) ("[C]aveat emptor in its pristine common law form is deemed
inapposite for the modem residential real estate transaction, yet perfectly suited for the
real estate transactions that took place as the doctrine was originally developed and
applied. It is the change in the very nature of the real estate transaction that caused the
doctrine of caveat emptor to become inapposite for real estate transactions." (emphasis
added».
312.
Quia Emptores, 1290, 18 Edw., c. 1 (Eng.).
313.
LH. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 298 (3d ed.
1990); THEODORE P.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 716
(5th ed. 1956).
314. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Can Religious InDuence Ever Be "Undue"
Influence?, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 579, 586 (2008).
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relationships.315 Contract law allows as many relationships to be
established by the bargaining parties as they desire. This does not
acknowledge the high stakes and special nature of land ownership in
particular. Thus, it makes sense to recognize that where someone's
home or residence is at stake, there must be more consideration or
protection. 316
The right to keep in the family residence context could also be
protected by animating state courts' equitable jurisdiction. For example,
a court could recognize the longstanding recognition of presumptions
against forfeitures in a case where exploitative or discriminatory
treatment is found. For example, certain Fair Housing Act cases have
found that exploitative dealing that uses race for targeting is a form of
discrimination that could violate the Act.317 Similarly, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 protections would also be implicated by such exploitative
behavior. 318 Another option would be for courts to invoke equitable
principles to avoid penalties where the mortgagee can be or otherwise
has been made whole. For example, in a number of cases where people

315. Merrill and Smith have commented the most extensively on this implicit
principle in their seminal article about the numerous clausus principle. Merril & Smith,
supra note 34, at 11-25.
316.
For example, under some state laws, debtors are allowed a homestead
exemption that allows the exclusion of the primary residence from attachment in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. See Victor D. LOpez, State Homestead Exemptions
and Bankruptcy Law: Is It Time for Congress to Close the Loophole?, 7 RUTGERS Bus.
LJ. 143, 165 (2010) ("[eJitizens of Arkansas, Washington D.C., Florida, Iowa,
Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas enjoy an unlimited personal exemption
for the equity in their primary residence. H). See generally Alison D. Morantz, There's
No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and Judicial Constructions of Family in
Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 245 (2006) (examining the
homestead exemption as a political movement and a reflection of complex contradictory
social policy).
317. See Howell, supra note 8, at 104 ("Although geographic discrimination
alone is not actionable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA or Title VIII), if a lender
exploits historic racial segregation by marketing higher-priced loans to minority
neighborhoods to profit from borrowers' lack of other options, such profiteering may
constitute actionable housing discrimination." (footnote omitted)). Howell notes,
however, that traditional housing discrimination doctrine is conceptually limited in its
underlying legal theory "to combat the new exploitation paradigm of housing
discrimination." Id. at 105.
318. These FHA cases are yet in their early stages of recognition of exploitive
dealing as a form of discrimination disparately impacting blacks. See id. at 137-42.
Based on the narrowing trajectory of other anti-discrimination doctrines in the courts,
this approach is likely subject to reversal once it becomes successful. For a discussion
about why the doctrine has been narrowed by courts in other areas of novel
discrimination claims like race or sexual harassment, see generally Rhonda M. Reaves,
One of These Things is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839 (2004).
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defaulted on longstanding mortgage loans, the banks may in fact have
already received payment for the balance of the loan, yet interest,
penalties, and fees are a good proportion of the arrears. Similarly, in
the ground-lease eviction cases in Baltimore, when owners were
surprised by ground leases and lost their homes for nominal sums of
money, equitable principles of fairness, proportionality, and unjust
forfeitures or enrichment should be invoked to avoid unjustifiable and
senselessly harmful outcomes. 319
The examples of ways for courts to utilize the common law to
avoid unjust results with negative systemic implications abound. Courts
have already construed exploitative sale-leasebacks as equitable
mortgages. 320 Constructive trust doctrine has been utilized to protect
ownership of property in situations where ownership interests were
outweighed by forfeiture concerns. 321 A variant of this doctrine could
be used in racially segregated communities that are subject to being
targeted for predatory behavior. Such property would thus not be
foreclosed upon without the review and approval of a trustee or the
court. Another creative approach could be to require that anyone
dealing with homeowner-occupiers in racially segregated communities
would be held to a fiduciary standard-that freedom of contract cannot
apply to racially segregated property owners in exploitative
arrangements.

D. Limit Disaggregation and Fragmentation: Lessons from
Primogeniture
Though primogeniture was an institution with repugnant
discriminatory aspects and was focused primarily on preserving family
dynasty, it still has lessons for the case of the rural Black landowners
who are losing property through partition sales. It should not be that a
stranger can use the formal rules of property to defeat the very power
319. See generally Thomas P. Egan, Equitable Doctrines Operating against the
Express Provisions of a Written Contract (or W71en Black and W71ite Equals Gray), 5
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 261 (1993) (extensive discussion of common law equitable policies
against waiver, forfeiture, and unjust enrichment to resolve contract disputes contrary
to the express provisions of the contracts).
320. See Koenig v. Van Rekken, 279 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(construing a sale-leaseback arrangement as an equitable mortgage arrangement);
Swenson v. Mills, 108 P.3d 77 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (construing a sale-leaseback
arrangement as an equitable mortgage arrangement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGAGES § 3.2 cmt. a (1997).
321. See, e.g., Rase v. Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc., 631 P.2d 680 (Mont.
1981) (holding that a purchaser of land underlying cabins owned by residents who had
only a revocable license to the underlying ground was obligated to allow cabins to
remain on land under a theory of constructive trust for the benefit of the cabin owners).
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of informal rules of familial co-ownership of property. Just as
primogeniture required an estate to be kept whole as it passed through
the family, so too should there be a recognition within co-ownership
and partnership doctrine that when there is a family involved, there
should be a substantive presumption, first in favor of the family, and
second in favor of the current occupants of the property. 322 Otherwise,
the wealthy investor/developer can appropriate the family's right to
decide when to sell and force a sale, with the help of property doctrine
and the courts, to him or herself. Such a destructive result can and
should be avoided.

E. Reexamine Recording Acts Presumptions with Respect to Fraud
It also makes sense to more openly acknowledge that, though we
universally condemn fraud, we tacitly understand it to be a part of
human nature and need to plan for the Ubiquity of fraudsters. :m We do
not often consider, however: what is attractive about fraud and who is
likely to be a fraudster?324 In some ways, one plausible view of
fraudsters is that they promote economic activity through exploiting
naIvete. A related view is that some forms of fraud involve risktaking-the thrill of the challenge. 325 For example, Satter documents
that there is a certain thrill to predatory behavior. 326 The speculators

322. For an example of a step in this direction, see UNIF, PARTITION OF HEIRS
PROP,
ACT
(2010),
available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
u!c/utcpa/201Oam_approved.htm.
323. Radin observes indirectly that conservative property theory does not "tell
us what to do if we think all property holdings now extant in the actual world do not
rest completely on chains of just transfer, but rather are all tainted by past fraud and
violence." RADIN, supra note 26, at 25.
324. See Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113
PENN ST. L. REv. 189, 214 (2008) (arguing that securities fraudsters suffer from
Antisocial Personality Disorder and are "probably 'hard wired' to commit manipulative
crimes"). Satter makes an interesting observation about how people react differently to
adversity. While her father had experienced a crippling childhood disability and had
been exposed to gross anti-Semitism, his exposure to his father's social idealism
"inspired in him a profound empathy for the oppressed." SATTER, supra note 167, at
3l. She noted that some of her father's childhood acquaintances, and later his
colleagues who also experienced a very harsh upbringing during the Depression,
viewed the world in terms of "victims and victimizers ... those who 'worked the
system' and those who were destroyed by it." Id. According to Satter, these men were
determined not to be on the victim side of the dividing line. Id
325. Grace Duffield & Peter Grabosky, The Psychology of Fraud, TRENDS &
ISSUES CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Canberra, Austl.), Mar.
2001, available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/181200/tandi 199 .aspx.
326. SATTER, supra note 167, at 74.
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engaged in predatory behavior both for the money, and simply because
they enjoyed it. 327 The psychology is such that it also represents a desire
for control-ego power, power over people, and situations. The sad
part of fraud is that to a great extent we blame the victim for
complicity. Though weak restraints lessen inhibition to commit fraud,328
there is a sense that everyone does it, and it represents astute business
acumen. As indicated by those who are likely to be defrauded-the
elderly, naive, indiscreet, lonely, and depressed329-recommended
solutions for face-to-face fraud, such as education, are likely
insufficient. 330 Education in the face of fraudulent, predatory behavior
is the equivalent to locking doors while the system gives certain people
a passkey. For example, if certain people have a personality passkey by
virtue of their persistence, then the problem is not really lack of
education, but a failure in a surveillance and enforcement regime. 331
One approach might be to more carefully delineate the protections
for property owners that are implicit corollaries of the recording acts,
akin to a dormant recording act. The recording acts, adopted as part of
327. Id.
328. Duffield & Grabosky, supra note 325, at 6 ("[T]here are many situations
in which personality and motivations lie beyond the reach of policy. In these cases,
those who would prevent and control fraud must look to reducing opportunities and to
exercising a degree of surveillance. ").
329. Peter Grabosky & Grace Duffield, The Red Flags of Fraud, TRENDS &
ISSUES CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Canberra, Austl.), Mar.
2001,
at 5-6,
available at http://pandora.nla.gov .au/pan/108501201102021704/www.aic.gov.au/publications/current %20series/tandi/ 181-200/tandi200.html
(" Although confidence men may portray their victims as corrupt and greedy many of
these victims are somewhat passive people who were either naIve or indiscreet in
money handling. In some cases they were also found to be lonely and depressed. This
was particularly characteristic of elderly women who were victims of face-to-face
fraud." (citations omitted) (citing RICHARD H. BLUM, DECEIVERS AND DECEIVED:
OBSERVATIONS ON CONFIDENCE MEN AND THEIR VICTIMS, INFORMANTS AND THEIR
QUARRY, POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL SPIES AND ORDINARY CITIZENS 69 (1972))).
330. Id. at 6 ("Regardless of the fact that some people in the community seem
to be more vulnerable to face-to-face fraud than others, the most effective bulwark
against face-to-face fraud is to educate prospective victims about the risks which they
face. Consumer awareness is the first line of defense, and responsibility for this must
be widely shared. First and foremost, the individual consumer has a responsibility to
become informed of the risks involved in commercial transactions, and of what steps to
take to protect oneself. Government agencies and industry associations are ideally
situated to impart information to consumers and to alert them to pitfalls in the
marketplace. ").
331. See Barnard, supra note 324, at 193, 220-21 (arguing that habitual
securities fraud recidivists are largely unaffected by traditional approaches to law
enforcement such as monetary penalties, injunctions, or incarceration.). The author
hypothesizes that offenders in this group, much like sex offenders, may be "hard
wired" to engage in fraudulent behavior. Id. at 214. She proposes a series of new
enforcement strategies to deal with this predatory population. Id. at 223-26.
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every state's property rights management system, require recording
property transfers in the land records office in order for bona fide
purchasers to be protected against conflicting claims. While bona fide
purchasers are immunized for transfers to them, insufficient protections
exist for the true owner who may be defrauded out of their property.
As a matter of property, morality, and ethics, and as a necessary
corollary to these extraordinary protections, there should be a dormant
recording act right for true owners that (1) the land records system will
stay updated and consistent with current technologies and course of
dealings that are predominant in the day; and (2) true owners will be
indemnified by the state for loss of their property that thieves using the
open access to information were able to carry out by virtue of that
access.
CONCLUSION

Principles in support of alienation have allowed property to lessen
dead-hand control in favor of the market. 332 More thought must be
given to how the policies of free alienation supported by property
facilitate that dispossession in light of the realities of modem systems of
real estate finance, real estate ownership documentation, and the
prevalence of predatory behavior.
Fundamentally, the notion that there is a right to keep is an
important recognition of an important aspect of property rights. It is an
implied yet necessary aspect of all of the other sticks in the bundle
because it is fundamental for continuing to own property. The ability to
continue to own property until one is ready to part with it reflects and
maintains fair and sustainable social relations among people. Thus,
alienation needs to be both promoted yet scrutinized for reasonable
ways to restrain it. When financing facilitates a multiplicity of new
property relationships via contract that are not self-evident to owners
and are misleading, they contradict the very notion underlying the
protections property is supposed to provide. Existing notions of stability
underlying property doctrine, particularly the qualified right to keep,
should be utilized by courts to avoid unjust results, especially where
legislatures or regulatory bodies have been paralyzed to step in. The
protections sketched here are not without flaws, but are simply intended
to free our thinking about the potential of existing law. At a minimum,
however, the notion of a right to keep forces us to think about ways to
ensure that instability is no longer disproportionate and destructive, and
332. Susan Rose-Ackennan, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 931 (1985) ("Inalienability can be defmed as any restriction
on the transferability, ownership, or use of an entitlement. ").
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that all homeowners have a right to keep their property so long as they
desire and have complied with reasonable financing terms. Not only
will they be the beneficiaries of their investment-backed expectations in
property ownership, regardless of race or geography, but the system of
property ownership will regain its moral foundations, and its
contributions to society will be beneficially and fairly distributed.

